Monthly Archives: July 2015

Scrapping ‘zero carbon’ homes is policy vandalism





You may have missed it among all the talk of minimum wages and welfare cuts, but as part of its summer budget announcements the UK government also abolished the requirement for new homes to be ‘zero carbon’ from April 2016.

A commitment in place since 2006 and supported through successive governments, now thrown into a bonfire of supposed ‘red tape’ holding back new building projects and the productivity of the UK economy. It’s an appalling act of policy vandalism.

I heard the news on my way back from a big international conference in Paris on Our Common Future under Climate Change, a prelude to the next round of climate negotiations to take place later this year.

Listening to speaker after speaker stressing the urgency of climate action – and the attempts by at least some of those present to be optimistic about what might be agreed – I deluded myself into thinking that maybe the carbon question would now be taken seriously, even in the UK with a government demonstrating at every step its now true-blue ideology.

From praiseworthy ambition to total copout

The zero-carbon homes policy was properly ambitious (at least in its original form). It focused on radically reducing the emissions from housing through a combination of energy-efficient building design and use of low or zero-carbon energy generation, such as solar panels.

More recently forms of carbon offsetting were allowed as part of the ‘zero’ calculation so that carbon could be mitigated away from the immediate development site. The Conservative government has now scrapped both this allowable solutions policy and the increase in on-site energy efficiency standards, taking away the foundations of zero-carbon compliance.

The meaning of the ‘zero’ had already been diluted, stripped of any sense of entailing new ways of ongoing low-carbon living – and the closely-related Code for Sustainable Homes had been got rid of. But even so, at least the zero-carbon requirement was still in place in some form.

Not now. Not after nine years of intensive collaborative work by the Zero Carbon Hub, set up after the obligation was first put in place to work out exactly what the zero would mean, how it would be calculated and to provide guidance to housing industry on all sorts of detailed aspects of compliance.

This is what makes it policy vandalism and a damaging breach of trust that can only undermine attempts at collaborative initiatives in the future.

Raising energy bills, and sending all the wrong signals

It’s not just those trying (increasingly desperately) to make the case for action on climate change that have protested. The British Property Federation, the Chartered Institute of Building the UK Green Building Council and some (but not all) other industry bodies have registered their protest at the loss of a long-term commitment to improving the energy and carbon efficiency of new homes.

The government’s argument is that scrapping the zero-carbon obligation will stimulate house building and help reduce house prices. But the evidence is lacking for both claims, with high house prices in particular far more a function of the dysfunctional way that property markets work in the UK and the lack of a proper regional policy to distribute jobs and growth more evenly across the economy.

More fundamentally, a decision that can only serve to increase our carbon emissions projected into the future sends absolutely all the wrong signals, including to those governments in the Global South that quite rightly point out our historic and contemporary responsibility for carbon accumulation.

Maybe house builders will still take up some of the innovation and capacity for building in new low-carbon ways that have been developed over the past nine years. But without the regulatory push it is hard to imagine that things will not level out at a lower standard.

There is now an open invitation to build less carbon-efficient houses, for profit-making at the expense of our deep moral responsibility to act now to mitigate future climate impacts.

Yes new homes are needed (in some places), but not at this cost, and not in a way that destroys even the limited sense of what ‘zero carbon’ had become.

 


 

Gordon Walker is Professor at the DEMAND Centre and Lancaster Environment Centre at Lancaster University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 






Scrapping ‘zero carbon’ homes is policy vandalism





You may have missed it among all the talk of minimum wages and welfare cuts, but as part of its summer budget announcements the UK government also abolished the requirement for new homes to be ‘zero carbon’ from April 2016.

A commitment in place since 2006 and supported through successive governments, now thrown into a bonfire of supposed ‘red tape’ holding back new building projects and the productivity of the UK economy. It’s an appalling act of policy vandalism.

I heard the news on my way back from a big international conference in Paris on Our Common Future under Climate Change, a prelude to the next round of climate negotiations to take place later this year.

Listening to speaker after speaker stressing the urgency of climate action – and the attempts by at least some of those present to be optimistic about what might be agreed – I deluded myself into thinking that maybe the carbon question would now be taken seriously, even in the UK with a government demonstrating at every step its now true-blue ideology.

From praiseworthy ambition to total copout

The zero-carbon homes policy was properly ambitious (at least in its original form). It focused on radically reducing the emissions from housing through a combination of energy-efficient building design and use of low or zero-carbon energy generation, such as solar panels.

More recently forms of carbon offsetting were allowed as part of the ‘zero’ calculation so that carbon could be mitigated away from the immediate development site. The Conservative government has now scrapped both this allowable solutions policy and the increase in on-site energy efficiency standards, taking away the foundations of zero-carbon compliance.

The meaning of the ‘zero’ had already been diluted, stripped of any sense of entailing new ways of ongoing low-carbon living – and the closely-related Code for Sustainable Homes had been got rid of. But even so, at least the zero-carbon requirement was still in place in some form.

Not now. Not after nine years of intensive collaborative work by the Zero Carbon Hub, set up after the obligation was first put in place to work out exactly what the zero would mean, how it would be calculated and to provide guidance to housing industry on all sorts of detailed aspects of compliance.

This is what makes it policy vandalism and a damaging breach of trust that can only undermine attempts at collaborative initiatives in the future.

Raising energy bills, and sending all the wrong signals

It’s not just those trying (increasingly desperately) to make the case for action on climate change that have protested. The British Property Federation, the Chartered Institute of Building the UK Green Building Council and some (but not all) other industry bodies have registered their protest at the loss of a long-term commitment to improving the energy and carbon efficiency of new homes.

The government’s argument is that scrapping the zero-carbon obligation will stimulate house building and help reduce house prices. But the evidence is lacking for both claims, with high house prices in particular far more a function of the dysfunctional way that property markets work in the UK and the lack of a proper regional policy to distribute jobs and growth more evenly across the economy.

More fundamentally, a decision that can only serve to increase our carbon emissions projected into the future sends absolutely all the wrong signals, including to those governments in the Global South that quite rightly point out our historic and contemporary responsibility for carbon accumulation.

Maybe house builders will still take up some of the innovation and capacity for building in new low-carbon ways that have been developed over the past nine years. But without the regulatory push it is hard to imagine that things will not level out at a lower standard.

There is now an open invitation to build less carbon-efficient houses, for profit-making at the expense of our deep moral responsibility to act now to mitigate future climate impacts.

Yes new homes are needed (in some places), but not at this cost, and not in a way that destroys even the limited sense of what ‘zero carbon’ had become.

 


 

Gordon Walker is Professor at the DEMAND Centre and Lancaster Environment Centre at Lancaster University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 






Scrapping ‘zero carbon’ homes is policy vandalism





You may have missed it among all the talk of minimum wages and welfare cuts, but as part of its summer budget announcements the UK government also abolished the requirement for new homes to be ‘zero carbon’ from April 2016.

A commitment in place since 2006 and supported through successive governments, now thrown into a bonfire of supposed ‘red tape’ holding back new building projects and the productivity of the UK economy. It’s an appalling act of policy vandalism.

I heard the news on my way back from a big international conference in Paris on Our Common Future under Climate Change, a prelude to the next round of climate negotiations to take place later this year.

Listening to speaker after speaker stressing the urgency of climate action – and the attempts by at least some of those present to be optimistic about what might be agreed – I deluded myself into thinking that maybe the carbon question would now be taken seriously, even in the UK with a government demonstrating at every step its now true-blue ideology.

From praiseworthy ambition to total copout

The zero-carbon homes policy was properly ambitious (at least in its original form). It focused on radically reducing the emissions from housing through a combination of energy-efficient building design and use of low or zero-carbon energy generation, such as solar panels.

More recently forms of carbon offsetting were allowed as part of the ‘zero’ calculation so that carbon could be mitigated away from the immediate development site. The Conservative government has now scrapped both this allowable solutions policy and the increase in on-site energy efficiency standards, taking away the foundations of zero-carbon compliance.

The meaning of the ‘zero’ had already been diluted, stripped of any sense of entailing new ways of ongoing low-carbon living – and the closely-related Code for Sustainable Homes had been got rid of. But even so, at least the zero-carbon requirement was still in place in some form.

Not now. Not after nine years of intensive collaborative work by the Zero Carbon Hub, set up after the obligation was first put in place to work out exactly what the zero would mean, how it would be calculated and to provide guidance to housing industry on all sorts of detailed aspects of compliance.

This is what makes it policy vandalism and a damaging breach of trust that can only undermine attempts at collaborative initiatives in the future.

Raising energy bills, and sending all the wrong signals

It’s not just those trying (increasingly desperately) to make the case for action on climate change that have protested. The British Property Federation, the Chartered Institute of Building the UK Green Building Council and some (but not all) other industry bodies have registered their protest at the loss of a long-term commitment to improving the energy and carbon efficiency of new homes.

The government’s argument is that scrapping the zero-carbon obligation will stimulate house building and help reduce house prices. But the evidence is lacking for both claims, with high house prices in particular far more a function of the dysfunctional way that property markets work in the UK and the lack of a proper regional policy to distribute jobs and growth more evenly across the economy.

More fundamentally, a decision that can only serve to increase our carbon emissions projected into the future sends absolutely all the wrong signals, including to those governments in the Global South that quite rightly point out our historic and contemporary responsibility for carbon accumulation.

Maybe house builders will still take up some of the innovation and capacity for building in new low-carbon ways that have been developed over the past nine years. But without the regulatory push it is hard to imagine that things will not level out at a lower standard.

There is now an open invitation to build less carbon-efficient houses, for profit-making at the expense of our deep moral responsibility to act now to mitigate future climate impacts.

Yes new homes are needed (in some places), but not at this cost, and not in a way that destroys even the limited sense of what ‘zero carbon’ had become.

 


 

Gordon Walker is Professor at the DEMAND Centre and Lancaster Environment Centre at Lancaster University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Conversation

 






Government turns fire on solar power





Solar subsidies look like being next on DECC’s renewable energy  chopping block.

Amber Rudd, secretary of state at the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), has warned that the government is “looking carefully” at the payments.

Speaking to Solar Power Portal at the official opening of the second phase of Ketton Solar Farm’s 13MW project, Rudd said:

“There has been a lot of subsidy in this area – a lot. More than people anticipated when the feed-in tariffs and the renewable obligation were set up and we have to find ways of supporting solar that doesn’t involve subsidy.”

This comes just a month after DECC announced it will scrap subsidies for new onshore wind projects from 1 April 2016. It also follows chancellor George Osborne’s £3.9 billion stealth attack on renewable energy, effectively making it pay a ‘carbon tax’ by withdrawing the Climate Change Levy exemption.

It also follows Rudd’s bullish post-election statement on solar power: “I want to unleash a new solar revolution – we have a million people living under roofs with solar panels and that number needs to increase”, she told her local newspaper, the Hastings & St Leonards Observer, shortly after her re-election last May.

Responding to the news, Daisy Sands, Greenpeace Head of Energy campaign, told DeSmog UK: “It is deeply worrying that the government looks as though it is about to pull the plug on solar subsidies … Cutting the subsidies now will damage or even destroy the sector.”

Rudd, on Monday, explained that subsidies might be cut for solar due to DECC overspending on the Levy Control Framework (LCF) – this aims to provide certainty to investors while limiting financial impact on those who will ultimately foot the bill for new renewable and low-carbon electricity schemes.

Renewable energy budget ‘overspent’

Fears that the LCF spending cap for green power subsidies will be breached have been circulating for a while, but this week they ramped up further as the Office for Budget Responsibility released its official forecast.

In 2012, the coalition set a cap of £7.6bn for 2020/21. Forecasts now predict that spending will reach £9.1bn by this time, some 20% over the original LCF cap.

“We have to look very carefully at the cost going forward, and I think the industry is expecting that”, Rudd told Solar Power Portal. “I’d like to see solar at grid parity. I’d like to see lots of solar without subsidy – that’s the ideal outcome.”

But Sands argued that the spending had in fact been highly successful at bringing solar costs down, but cutting it now would put those gains at risK: “All the money that has already been invested in the renewable energy industry will be completely wasted if funding is cut.

“Combined with the cuts to wind subsidies, it looks like the government is gearing up for a full frontal attack on the renewable energy sector. Jobs will go and emissions will rise at a time when policies and funding should be in place to ensure quite the opposite.”

These comments are echoed by Jonathan Selwyn, managing director of Lark Energy Commercial which developed the Ketton solar project.

Speaking at the project’s opening on Monday, Selwyn said: “The recent changes in government support means that many large scale solar projects of this type are now not viable. The solar industry is making rapid progress in reducing costs, and will become the first energy source to be subsidy free by 2020.

“However, we would urge the government to provide stability and certainty for the industry as we make the journey to zero subsidy. This will enable us to continue to provide significant new clean energy capacity and maintain the many thousands of jobs in the sector.”

All the eggs into the nuclear basket case

Current government policy on power generation is increasingly focused on new nuclear stations. Although subject to numerous problems, the government intends to pay £92.50 per MWh for power from the proposed Hinkley C nuclear plant, more than double the current average wholesale price of electricity, inflation proofed for 35 years.

Further nuclear plants planned for sites at Moorside, Bradwell and Wylfa will likely demand similar levels of subsidy, along with construction finance guarantees adding up to as much as £50 billion. The overall subsidy for Hinkley C alone has been estimated at over €100 billion.

But with none of these new nuclear projects likely to come on stream until 2030, and solar power expected to be fully cost competitive with fossil fuels by 2020, the policy is looking ever more paradoxical.

 


 

Kyla Mandel is Deputy Editor of DeSmog UK. She tweets @kylamandel.

This article was originally published on DeSmog.uk. This version includes additional reporting by The Ecologist.

 






Fox hunting is political poison for David Cameron and the Tory Party





Harold Wilson famously said a week is a long time in politics and David Cameron must be reflecting on these words after his humiliating climb down on the Hunting Act amendment vote.

His attempt last week to weaken the Hunting Act before the summer recess and test the water for full repeal in this Parliament, went spectacularly wrong. And he only has himself to blame.

David Cameron has in many ways been a successful moderniser for the Tory Party over the last decade. He played a key role in decontaminating the Tory brand during the Blair years and gambled on joining a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, that put the Tory Party firmly in the political middle ground on social and economic policies and paved the way for his surprise election victory on May 7th.

However, when it comes to the countryside and blood sports he remains very much a traditional conservative. Now this threatens to damage not just his reputation, but the Tory Party as well.

Growing up as part of a wealthy family at the heart of the political and landowning establishment, blood sports were a major influence on David Cameron’s life from a early age. Prior to becoming leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron had stalked and shot deer, been a regular participant at game bird shoots and had rode with his local fox hunt, the Heythrop, in his Oxfordshire constituency.

Before the 2015 General Election, David Cameron wrote in the Countryside Alliance Magazine “I have always been a strong supporter of country sports it is my firm belief that people should have the right to hunt.”

The BBC’s Andrew Marr might have gone too far by stating in his interview with the Prime Minister during the election campaign, that foxhunting was his “favourite sport which I love”, but there can be no doubting how ingrained blood sports are to David Cameron’s his view of the countryside.

Cameron’s and the Countryside Alliance

The fact that David Cameron started his rise to the top of the Tory Party during the aftermath of Tony Blair’s huge election victory in 1997, is also a key factor in his support for hunting.

When the Tories were in the political wilderness after 1997, the Countryside Alliance was formed as a key voice for hunting and landowning interests with close links to the Tory Party, helping to shore up its power base in rural constituencies.

The Countryside Alliance’s pro hunt pro blood sports agenda became a key factor in dividing town from country and painting the New Labour Government as an enemy of traditional country pursuits. As a new Tory MP with ambitions to become a future party leader, David Cameron was happy to harness the support of the Countryside Alliance and promote its objectives within the Tory Party.

He pledged as opposition leader to put a commitment to repeal the 2004 Hunting Act in the 2010 Tory election manifesto. The coalition with the Liberal Democrats prevented this being implemented, but the commitment remained in the 2015 Tory Manifesto at David Cameron’s insistence.

David Cameron was as surprised as the rest of the nation by the outcome of the General Election on May 7th, which resulted in the first Tory majority government for 23 years.

Within days of the election result the Countryside Alliance and their allies in the media were promoting the view that repeal of the Hunting Act would be subject to a free vote in the House of Commons before Christmas.

Things aren’t what they used to be – including the Conservative Party

Liz Truss the newly re-appointed Environment Secretary was given the task of preparing the ground for a vote, with a number of media statements and speeches where she stated that fox hunting should return to our countryside.

The problem for David Cameron was that he failed to recognise that an awful lot had changed in the Tory Party, in the decade since the Hunting Act became law.

As the Tory Parties election prospects improved from 2005 onwards, new Tory MPs started to enter the Commons, who unlike the Prime Minister were not close to the hunting and blood sports lobby. Many came from the financial services sector, or from the media and business world and would not dream of spending their weekends chasing foxes or stalking stags.

We also started to see the emergence of a strong animal welfare and wildlife protection lobby within the Tory Party in the shape of Blue Fox, run by the energetic, well connected and highly effective campaigner Lorraine Platt.

During the coalition government we started to see this new generation of MPs speak out publicly against both fox hunting and badger culling and question the strong links between the Prime Minister and the hunting and farming lobby groups, which were pushing these highly unpopular issues within the government.

After the Tory election victory on May 7th a number of these outspoken MPs such as Tracey Crouch and Dominic Raab, were appointed as Ministers and are now seen as rising stars in the Tory Party.

Oh – and don’t forget public opinion

The Prime Minister also failed to realise that the Hunting Act had huge popular support, not least from many Tory voters who had given him a majority on the 7 May.

During the last week over half a million people have signed a petition against the return of fox hunting and MPs have been inundated with hundreds of thousands of complaints from constituents on the weakening of the Hunting Act, on a scale not seen since Tony Blair decided to go to war in Iraq in 2003.

By the time of the planned vote in Parliament on the amendment of the Hunting Act, David Cameron was fighting against public opinion, a significant part of his own Party as well as the Labour Party and the SNP. This was a battle on all fronts which he could not possibly win and he was forced to beat a hasty retreat or face an embarrassing defeat.

The most likely successors to David Cameron as Prime Minister, George Osborne, Theresa May or Boris Johnson are not close to the blood sports lobby and are very unlikely to risk their political credibility on the issue of fox hunting.

Zac Goldsmith,  the Tory favourite for London Mayor, has also made it clear that he does not support the amendment or repeal of the Hunting Act.

Indeed a key factor in him being elected Mayor in London, could be the ability to reach out to a green alliance of voters from across the political spectrum who strongly support his opposition to David Cameron on issues such as Heathrow runway extension, badger culling, use of neonicotinoid pesticides and the return of fox hunting.

For most Tory MPs, fox hunting is best kept dead and buried

The Countryside Alliance remains a strong and influential force in the Tory Party, but it no longer has all Tory MPs in a headlock over support for hunting and blood sports.

As Tory MPs prepare for the long summer recess, they are making it very clear to the Prime Minister that he badly miscalculated on the fox hunting issue and has caused much unnecessary anger in their constituencies.

Fox hunting is now seen as political poison and few Tory MPs will want to see this issue re-emerge during this five year Parliament. Many now see David Cameron and his views on fox hunting as representing the past, not the future of the Tory Party.

 


 

Dominic Dyer is CEO of the Badger Trust. He spoke at the protest at the Downing Street gates last week against Cameron’s plan to ‘fatally amend’ the Huntin Act (see photo).

Also on The Ecologist:Hunting Act ‘amendment’ is repeal in disguise‘ by Robbie Marsland.

 






Ruthless power and deleterious politics: from DDT to Roundup





Morton Biskind, a physician from Westport, Connecticut, was a courageous man.

At the peak of the cold war, in 1953, he complained of maladies afflicting both domestic animals and people for the first time. He concluded that the popular insect poison DDT was the agent of their disease.

DDT, he said, was “dangerous for all animal life from insects to mammals.” Yet he was astonished at what little was done to restrict or ban DDT. On the contrary, officials and scientists defended it:

“[V]irtually the entire apparatus of communication, lay and scientific alike, has been devoted to denying, concealing, suppressing, distorting … [the bad news about DDT]. Libel, slander and economic boycott have not been overlooked …

“And a new principle of toxicology has … become firmly entrenched … no matter how lethal a poison may be for all other forms of animal life, if it doesn’t kill human beings instantly, it is safe. When … it unmistakably does kill a human, this was the victim’s own fault – either he was ‘allergic’ to it … or he didn’t use it properly.” (Biskind 1953).

The warnings of Biskind went nowhere. The Pentagon was testing nuclear weapons above ground and agribusiness was expanding its conquest of rural America – and the world. The strategic interests of the Pentagon coincided with those of agribusiness.

Rachel Carson, the author of Silent Spring, listened to Biskind. She denounced the hegemony of chemical pesticides, “the sinister and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the very nature of the world – the very nature of its life.” She said America’s single-crop farming clashes with how nature works.

Instead, “we allow the chemical death rain to fall … The crusade to create a chemically sterile world seems to have engendered a fanatic zeal on the part of many specialists and most of the so-called control agencies … there is evidence that those engaged in spraying operations exercise a ruthless power.” (Rachel Carson, Silent Spring.)

But regulators looked the other way

Meanwhile, federal agencies and official science pretended nothing was wrong. The US Environmental Protection Agency, born in 1970, had to start from the beginning with toxic chemicals some 17 years after Biskind’s complaint.

The political and economic forces of agribusiness, the chemical industry, and politicians forged an unofficial alliance between the Pentagon and big agriculture, with agriculture borrowing the Pentagon’s chemical warfare strategy for American farmers.

Furthermore, the missionaries of agricultural industrialization adopted and spread the profitable new approach to chemical danger – what Biskind aptly called “a new principle of toxicology” – that still reigns supreme among the practitioners of conventional science and politics in the early 21st century. Like a gigantic octopus, the chemical industry put its tentacle all over Congress, the White House and land grant universities.

No wonder most toxic chemicals have been entering the market without being tested for health and environmental effects. Only the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the food and drug part of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act require testing of chemicals.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the cosmetic provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, as well as all other federal laws require no testing for the chemicals or other products entering the market. This does not prevent the industry men and women say the products of their companies “meet EPA standards.”

A lethal combination: highly toxic, highly persistent

DDT came out of that careless chemical culture – and war. DDT was successful in fighting malaria during World War II. For that reason, in 1948, its inventor, the Swiss scientist Paul Miller, received the Nobel Prize for medicine. By then DDT was used widely in America. The US Department of Agriculture ‘registered’ it in 1945.

The popularity of DDT had nothing to do with its presumed ‘safety’. DDT killed more than insects. DDT doomed birds by making it impossible to give birth to live chicks. Their brittle shell cracked under the weight of the adult bird during hatching.

DDT was particularly deleterious to predatory birds, bringing peregrine falcons, osprey, brown pelicans, and bald eagles to the brink of extinction. DDT also killed many insects it had not been designed to target, and also small animals, which ate DDT-poisoned fish and wildlife.

The deathly legacy of DDT and DDT-like chemicals has been a long one. The reason is their chemical properties: DDT belongs to the organochlorines, a huge group of chlorine-based poisons that last for decades in nature while accumulating in the fat of the animal ingesting them.

It was the human effects of DDT that convinced EPA to ban it in 1972. EPA considered DDT “a potential human carcinogen.” By that time, the early 1970s, DDT had contaminated “staple human foods, especially meat and milk.” In 1973, a federal judge did not know what to do since DDT had contaminated nearly all foods.

He said, “Although the cancer aspects of DDT are frightening, the obvious solution to that problem, that is, a total ban on foods containing DDT, is not available. Virtually every food contains some DDT … DDT has presented, and apparently will continue to present a massive dilemma both for EPA and for society.” (USA vs Goodman, 1973)

The same happened to the global environment. In 1979, two Wildlife Society scientists, Steven G. Herman and John B. Bulger, reported that DDT was “the most widespread and pernicious of global pollutants.” (Herman and Bulger 1979).

The hegemony of glyphosate

The banning of DDT in America in 1972 did not bring about any rethinking of factory farming and its addiction to deleterious pesticides. In fact, large industrialized and pesticide-dependent farms are now crowding the planet. Their owners preach a war on hunger but in actual practice their war is directed against the natural world and small farmers and peasants.

And despite their propaganda for feeding the world, they only produce about a third of the world food. Peasants, not industrialized farmers, feed most of the world’s people (Douwe van der Ploeg, 2014). But industrialized farmers are responsible for huge harm done to the natural world and people. That harm comes in the form of global warming and the poisoning of wildlife, rivers, drinking water, and food.

Other toxins replaced DDT. One that became extremely successful worldwide is glyphosate, the so-called active ingredient of Roundup weed killer. This herbicide is a product of the multinational giant seed and agribusiness company Monsanto.

Glyphosate received its EPA registration in 1974. This was a time of deep corruption in the chemical industry. For a few decades before and after 1974, laboratories widely fabricated ‘safety’ studies of pesticides, other chemicals, and also drugs.

The fraud enabled these to benefit from government registration. It opened the doors to sales. I don’t know if glyphosate entered the market through fraud. But I do know 1974, the year EPA registered glyphosate, was a year of corruption for most pesticides. The EPA scientist who uncovered the lab fraud, Adrian Gross, was my friend and colleague.

Just like DDT, glyphosate quickly became a global celebrity. Scientists on the payroll of the industry, including scientists of our land grant universities, declared it ‘safe’. Farmers, gardeners and lawn keepers adopted it widely.

Everyone was happy. Well, almost everyone …

However, not everybody was happy seeing another weed killer making the rounds all over the world. Glyphosate caught the attention of Don Huber, a retired Colonel from the army’s biological warfare corps and a retired academic scientist from Purdue University where he taught for 35 years.

Of all the things he knows about biological weapons and diseases and crops, he is the most concerned about the effects of pesticides on the biological systems making up agriculture. He illustrates his anxiety with the effects of glyphosate on crops.

Glyphosate is more than a best-selling weed killer. It is also a powerhouse of genetic engineering. Its masters have bioengineered crops, called Roundup Ready soybeans, Roundup Ready corn, etc., to resist its killing power. This is music to the ears of farmers who can clear their fields of weeds just by spraying their crops with glyphosate.

Monsanto would like one day to control the world’s food supply. With that imperial purpose in mind, Monsanto has been using seeds, crops, pesticides, and genetic engineering to spread its know-how throughout the planet.

But like other agribusiness giants, hubris keeps it blind to the harm its products may often cause to humans and the natural world. Studies published in 2010 show glyphosate is causing birth defects in frogs and chicken embryos at amounts smaller than those farmers and gardeners leave in food (Paganelli et al. 2010).

Older studies document: cancer, endocrine disruption, damage to DNA, and deleterious malformations of the reproductive, neurological and developmental systems of animals, including human beings (Richard et al. 2005; Benachour et al. 2007).

Some researchers also link glyphosate to miscarriages afflicting people and livestock. Both the industry, including Monsanto, and government authorities have known about the toxic effects of glyphosate since the 1980s. Yet both industry and regulators have kept the public in the dark.

How glyphosate promotes harmful microbes and plant disease

According to Huber, “glyphosate promotes soil pathogens and is already implicated with the increase of more than 40 plant diseases.” Furthermore, Huber reported that glyphosate “dismantles plant defenses” against disease by immobilizing vital nutrients, which means the growing crop is starved of the nutrients it must have to defend itself against disease and to be nutritious. Such impoverished crops, says Huber, are causing “animal disorders.”

On November 1, 2011, Huber visited England where he made a presentation to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Agroecology of the House of Commons (Huber, 2011). His main argument was that glyphosate “predisposes plants to disease” and “stimulates pathogens” in the soil.

In other words, glyphosate acts by compromising the defense of crops against disease; glyphosate kills the targeted plants (weeds) by becoming a biological war agent, in a sense, boosting disease organisms in the soil while killing disease resistance organisms.

For the last 30 years glyphosate has been sterilizing the land of organisms that are essential for the health of crops. Such microorganisms are the highways through which plants absorb essential micronutrients.

They are also responsible for fixing up to 75% of the nitrogen legumes like soybeans, alfalfa and peas need for protein. By killing microorganisms, glyphosate reduces the ability of crops to take up micronutrients from the earth. These micronutrients, like calcium, nickel, copper, iron, manganese and zinc are essential for the health and nutritional quality of crops and, therefore, the health of animals and people eating these crops.

Huber connected the micronutrient deficiencies in crops to evidence of stillborn calves and animal disease.

Civilization under threat

Like Morton Biskind in 1953, Huber in 2011 spoke of the danger of a new super weed killer, glyphosate. In both cases, separated by 58 years, we have the sick feeling little, maybe nothing, has changed. The same irresponsible agribusiness activities threaten the possible devastation of American agriculture.

Huber denounces the betrayal of public trust by government, industry and academia. In fact, he cites a letter from 26 university entomologists to EPA in which these scientists complain they are prohibited from doing research because their universities receive money from genetic engineering companies to advance their mission, not the public good.

And Huber laments the inexplicable reality of “how willing we’ve been to sacrifice our children and future generations and to jeopardize the sustainability of our entire agricultural infrastructure that is the very basis of our existence as a society.”

In spite of the warnings of Huber and other scientists, the USDA ‘regulators’ of genetically engineered crops continue with business as usual. The EPA ‘regulators’ of pesticides also continue with business as usual.

The USDA recently approved 2,4-D for a new genetically modified corn. Apparently, they forgot the ‘weed killer’ 2,4-D was a chemical weapon in the Vietnam War. Like its Agent Orange sibling, 2,4,5-T, the herbicide 2,4-D was contaminated by the lethal 2378-dioxin. Adding 2,4-D to the arsenal of GM crops doesn’t bode well for America and the world.

No more death rain

Fortunately, there’s resistance to business as usual. I cited Biskind and Carson but in the late 1960s, biologist Paul Shepard attacked the insanity of industrialization. He said ecology was more than a science. It was a resistance movement.

He said ecologists are subversive because they challenge our ‘right’ to pollute the environment, destroy predatory animals, spread pesticides everywhere, contaminate water and food, and appropriate the land for military and industrial purposes.

Furthermore, ecology subverts our delusions of unlimited human population, the domestication of all wild places, large-scale manipulation of the atmosphere and the seas, and the extinction of species.

Resistance is now taking a new form: the removal of global toxins, unfortunately, one at a time. In early 2015, the usually timid and agribusiness-friendly, World Health Organization, declared both glyphosate and 2,4-D probable human carcinogens.

Following on this modest step, in May 14, 2015, the International Society of Doctors for the Environment, based in Basel, Switzerland, issued an appeal to the European governments: “To immediately and permanently ban, with no exceptions, the production, trade and use in all the EU territory of glyphosate-based herbicides.”

A pesticide-free future?

The UK journalist, Georgina Downs, echoes that sentiment to include all pesticides. Humans need a pesticides-free future. We need to appeal to all politicians all over the world to ban permanently and without exception all pesticides.

Glyphosate represents all pesticides. Our message and policies should be telling agribusiness companies enough is enough: no more death rain.

Monsanto, on the other hand, is building additional facilities to manufacture another weed killer by the name of dicamba in order to mix it up with glyphosate. That way the joint product will be more effective against the super weeds resisting glyphosate.

Pesticides are chemical weapons. They were brought to market under the cover of questionable and often fraudulent science and regulation. They are maintained in farming under the false pretense of feeding the world. They are danger itself; they are biocides. They are simply the money lubricants of giant agriculture.

They serve no public purpose. We don’t need them.

 


 

Evaggelos Vallianatos, Ph.D., is a former EPA analyst. He is the author of hundreds of articles and several books, including ‘Poison Spring: The Secret History of Pollution and the EPA’ (with McKay Jenkins, Bloomsbury Press, 2014).

This article was originally published on Independent Science News under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.

References

Benachour et al. (2007) Time-and dose-dependent effects of roundup on human embryonic and placental cells. Arch. Environ. Contam. Toxicol. 53, 126-133.

Biskind, M S (1953) “Public Health Aspects of the New Insecticides,” American Journal of Digestive Diseases 20: 331-341.

Douwe van der Ploeg, J “Peasant-driven agricultural growth and food sovereignty,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41: 999-1030.

Herman SG and Bulger JB (1979), “Effects of a Forest Application of DDT on Nontarget Organisms,” Wildlife Monographs, No 69: 49.

Hobbelink, HHungry for LandGrain, May 2014.

Huber, D M “The effects of glyphosate (Roundup) on soils, crops and consumers” (Presentation to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Agroecology, House of Commons, UK, 1 November 2011).

Paganelli A. et al. (2010) Glyphosate-Based Herbicides Produce Teratogenic Effects on Vertebrates by Impairing Retinoic Acid Signaling. Chem. Res. Toxicol. 23: 1586-1595.

Richard S, Moslemi S, Sipahutar H, Benachour N and Seralini G E (2005) Differential Effects of Glyphosate and Roundup on Human Placental Cells and Aromatase. Environmental Health Perspectives 113: 716-720.

Shepard, P ‘Ecology and Man – a Viewpoint’ in The Subversive Science, ed. Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969) 9.

United States v. Goodman 486 F. 2d at 855 (7th Cir. 1973).

 






Nugen’s AP1000 nuclear reactor – is it any better than the EPR?





The engineering problems of the EPR are well-known.

The nuclear power stations being built in Finland and France using this design are well over budget, are failing to meet even frequently revised timetables and are dogged with concerns over construction integrity.

Olkiluoto 3 in Finland is now expected to start producing electricity in 2018, thirteen years after work first began on the site. The project will cost many billions of Euros more than first predicted.

Despite these highly visible problems, warnings that the design is “unconstructable” and the new legal challenges from Austria and from green energy suppliers in Germany and Austria, EDF still wants to construct Hinkley C using the EPR design.

Others have suggested that an alternative design, Westinghouse’s AP1000, has a better future in the UK. Three of the reactors are planned for the Moorside proposed nuclear site next to Sellafield. Chinese reactor builders are also touting AP1000 variants for the UK’s Bradwell nuclear site, and even for Hinkley C should the EDF / Areva consortium withdraw.

An uncritical article in the Financial Times this week allowed the Westinghouse consortium a chance to expound on the strengths of the AP1000 design. The head of Nugen, the UK venture promoting the Westinghouse design, said: “We are using proven technology. The AP1000 has a good record of construction around the world.”

The facts suggest that these statements are lamentably false. Unfortunately for those of us who believe new nuclear should be a response to the increasingly urgent need to decarbonise electricity production, Westinghouse is having the same problems with the AP1000 as the unconstructible EPR.

AP1000 – a bundle of trouble?

The AP1000 is the next generation design being developed by Westinghouse, a subsidiary of Toshiba. Westinghouse constructs the AP1000 projects in partnership with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), probably the world’s most experienced builder of large power stations.

The AP1000 is a 1.1 GW plant using a design based on a much smaller power station developed by Westinghouse 20 years ago. One important fact is that no stations using the original design were ever built. However, the advantages of the AP1000 are said to include a relatively simple design, a high level of passive safety and modular construction.

Modular construction means that components can be manufactured elsewhere and then shipped to the power station site. However US sites have had 5,000 workers on site at the same time, posing the some of the same huge management challenges that were experienced at the Finnish EPR site.

Four AP1000 reactors are in construction in the US and four in China. The US plants are at two separate sites in the state of Georgia (‘Plant Vogtle’, two AP1000s) and South Carolina (‘Summer’, two AP1000s).

I focus here on the experience in Georgia, but note that similar three-year delays have also happened at Summer in South Carolina, where serious cost overruns have also taken place.

Plant Vogtle – construction times more than doubled

Vogtle 3 and 4 are being built in the same complex as two earlier nuclear power stations. After delays in final design approval, they were finally licenced in February 2012. Near-concurrent construction of the two plants started in May 2013 with completion of the first planned for April 2016.

Original estimates for the total price to the utilities buying the power stations were about $14bn (about £9.5bn). The price to be paid was essentially fixed, meaning that most of the construction risk is borne by Westinghouse and CB&I.

The most recent announcement of construction delays came in February 2015 when the station’s eventual 45% owner (Georgia Power) told the state regulator that the partnership building the station had recently estimated that the eventual completion date for Vogtle 3 would be June 2019. Vogtle 4 would be finished in June 2020.

The expected delay for Vogtle 3 is now 39 months, more than doubling the initially expected construction time. The project is not yet half complete.

And the costs are rising too …

Although the contract price has not risen significantly because it is largely fixed, the cost to electricity customers in the state of Georgia has increased. This is because the utilities that will eventually own the two new stations have been granted electricity price increases by the state regulator to cover the higher financing costs of Vogtle 3 and 4.

The utilities have been paying for individual elements of the two new plants as they are completed. The long delays mean that the interest costs are higher than expected and the regulator has already granted rate increases to compensate the eventual owners.

People in Georgia are already paying a supplement of 6% of their bills to finance the new nuclear station – Indeed Friends of the Earth US suggests that as much as 11% of their electricity bills may be supportiing the project.

Although the deal was a fixed price contract, the company buying the largest share of the finished plants is in legal battles over extra costs that the contractors claim that the purchasers should bear.

We can reasonably expect that the cost to construct the stations has also increased. However industry estimates of the eventual final cost to the contractors are vague and imprecise. They currently seem to be around $18bn (~£12bn). This seems low to me, given that the total project is now expected to take more than twice as long as originally expected.

CB&I says that Westinghouse will eventually pay most of the overrun costs but we can safely presume that this issue will also end up in court.

Georgia Power is losing faith in its contractors

Until recently the main buyer, Georgia Power, was reasonably content with the progress of the construction. However its 2015 submissions to the Georgia regulator have become increasingly concerned in response to the latest estimates of delay.

Note that Georgia Power has a difficult line to steer: it cannot be too critical of the contractors because otherwise the regulator that oversees it and grants its rate increases will question why it agreed to build the first new nuclear plant in the US for several decades in the first place!

Most recently, the company’s May 2015 testimony prepared for a hearing has been openly critical of the contractors Westinghouse and CB&I:

“In general, the Company, like the other Owners, has been disappointed with the Contractor’s performance under the revised IPS (project plan). The Contractor has missed several key milestones since the publication of the revised IPS in January 2015, including several milestones relating to critical-path or near-critical-path activities such as the assembly of CA01 (part of the central reactor), the delivery of shield building panels, and work on concrete outside containment.

“The Contractor has also encountered difficulties in ensuring that new vendors produce high-quality, compliant components per the IPS projections.” (p.15)

Georgia Power is now indicating that it has little faith in the contractor’s ability to keep to the new delayed timetable.

“The Contractor’s schedule performance on critical path work such as concrete placements to start shield building installation and inside containment installation are challenges to the Contractor’s ability to adhere to the revised IPS.

“The Contractor must continue to improve its schedule performance, maintain these improvements, and successfully resolve RCPs / squib valves / CMTs (components with severe quality or delivery problems) in order to complete the Facility by the currently projected substantial completion dates.” (p.15)

China’s AP1000s – a three year construction delay

Cost data from the Chinese construction projects is difficult to find. But they have also experienced significant construction difficulties. Building at Sanmen began construction in August 2009 and was originally expected to be finished by August 2013.

As with Vogtle, construction was said to be on schedule a year into the project and even in March 2012 completion was still officially planned for 2013. Recent updates suggests that completion will actually take place in 2016, also a three year delay.

The design used in China is simpler than that used in the US, and it may well be possible for Chinese constructors to build much more quickly and cheaply. However the modifications are unlikely to be acceptable to Western regulators. For example, the power stations are not designed to survive a direct hit from an airliner, a US requirement.

The questions in the minds of all concerned are surely these:

  • How many of the problems at Vogtle, Summer and elsewhere are inherent to the construction of a large third generation nuclear power station?
  • And how many simply arise because these are ‘first of a kind’ projects?
  • Will new nuclear projects around the world avoid the major problems that have affected the first eight AP1000s because the construction companies have learnt how to build these huge projects more efficiently?
  • Or is a safe third generation nuclear power station beyond the capacity of even the most experienced contractors to build to a tight timetable and at a predictable cost?

I’m afraid I don’t think the answer is at all clear.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change and valued contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was originally published on Carbon Commentary.

Also on The Ecologist:Toshiba’s nuclear project – cheaper than Hinkley C?

 






Nugen’s AP1000 nuclear reactor – is it any better than the EPR?





The engineering problems of the EPR are well-known.

The nuclear power stations being built in Finland and France using this design are well over budget, are failing to meet even frequently revised timetables and are dogged with concerns over construction integrity.

Olkiluoto 3 in Finland is now expected to start producing electricity in 2018, thirteen years after work first began on the site. The project will cost many billions of Euros more than first predicted.

Despite these highly visible problems, warnings that the design is “unconstructable” and the new legal challenges from Austria and from green energy suppliers in Germany and Austria, EDF still wants to construct Hinkley C using the EPR design.

Others have suggested that an alternative design, Westinghouse’s AP1000, has a better future in the UK. Three of the reactors are planned for the Moorside proposed nuclear site next to Sellafield. Chinese reactor builders are also touting AP1000 variants for the UK’s Bradwell nuclear site, and even for Hinkley C should the EDF / Areva consortium withdraw.

An uncritical article in the Financial Times this week allowed the Westinghouse consortium a chance to expound on the strengths of the AP1000 design. The head of Nugen, the UK venture promoting the Westinghouse design, said: “We are using proven technology. The AP1000 has a good record of construction around the world.”

The facts suggest that these statements are lamentably false. Unfortunately for those of us who believe new nuclear should be a response to the increasingly urgent need to decarbonise electricity production, Westinghouse is having the same problems with the AP1000 as the unconstructible EPR.

AP1000 – a bundle of trouble?

The AP1000 is the next generation design being developed by Westinghouse, a subsidiary of Toshiba. Westinghouse constructs the AP1000 projects in partnership with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), probably the world’s most experienced builder of large power stations.

The AP1000 is a 1.1 GW plant using a design based on a much smaller power station developed by Westinghouse 20 years ago. One important fact is that no stations using the original design were ever built. However, the advantages of the AP1000 are said to include a relatively simple design, a high level of passive safety and modular construction.

Modular construction means that components can be manufactured elsewhere and then shipped to the power station site. However US sites have had 5,000 workers on site at the same time, posing the some of the same huge management challenges that were experienced at the Finnish EPR site.

Four AP1000 reactors are in construction in the US and four in China. The US plants are at two separate sites in the state of Georgia (‘Plant Vogtle’, two AP1000s) and South Carolina (‘Summer’, two AP1000s).

I focus here on the experience in Georgia, but note that similar three-year delays have also happened at Summer in South Carolina, where serious cost overruns have also taken place.

Plant Vogtle – construction times more than doubled

Vogtle 3 and 4 are being built in the same complex as two earlier nuclear power stations. After delays in final design approval, they were finally licenced in February 2012. Near-concurrent construction of the two plants started in May 2013 with completion of the first planned for April 2016.

Original estimates for the total price to the utilities buying the power stations were about $14bn (about £9.5bn). The price to be paid was essentially fixed, meaning that most of the construction risk is borne by Westinghouse and CB&I.

The most recent announcement of construction delays came in February 2015 when the station’s eventual 45% owner (Georgia Power) told the state regulator that the partnership building the station had recently estimated that the eventual completion date for Vogtle 3 would be June 2019. Vogtle 4 would be finished in June 2020.

The expected delay for Vogtle 3 is now 39 months, more than doubling the initially expected construction time. The project is not yet half complete.

And the costs are rising too …

Although the contract price has not risen significantly because it is largely fixed, the cost to electricity customers in the state of Georgia has increased. This is because the utilities that will eventually own the two new stations have been granted electricity price increases by the state regulator to cover the higher financing costs of Vogtle 3 and 4.

The utilities have been paying for individual elements of the two new plants as they are completed. The long delays mean that the interest costs are higher than expected and the regulator has already granted rate increases to compensate the eventual owners.

People in Georgia are already paying a supplement of 6% of their bills to finance the new nuclear station – Indeed Friends of the Earth US suggests that as much as 11% of their electricity bills may be supportiing the project.

Although the deal was a fixed price contract, the company buying the largest share of the finished plants is in legal battles over extra costs that the contractors claim that the purchasers should bear.

We can reasonably expect that the cost to construct the stations has also increased. However industry estimates of the eventual final cost to the contractors are vague and imprecise. They currently seem to be around $18bn (~£12bn). This seems low to me, given that the total project is now expected to take more than twice as long as originally expected.

CB&I says that Westinghouse will eventually pay most of the overrun costs but we can safely presume that this issue will also end up in court.

Georgia Power is losing faith in its contractors

Until recently the main buyer, Georgia Power, was reasonably content with the progress of the construction. However its 2015 submissions to the Georgia regulator have become increasingly concerned in response to the latest estimates of delay.

Note that Georgia Power has a difficult line to steer: it cannot be too critical of the contractors because otherwise the regulator that oversees it and grants its rate increases will question why it agreed to build the first new nuclear plant in the US for several decades in the first place!

Most recently, the company’s May 2015 testimony prepared for a hearing has been openly critical of the contractors Westinghouse and CB&I:

“In general, the Company, like the other Owners, has been disappointed with the Contractor’s performance under the revised IPS (project plan). The Contractor has missed several key milestones since the publication of the revised IPS in January 2015, including several milestones relating to critical-path or near-critical-path activities such as the assembly of CA01 (part of the central reactor), the delivery of shield building panels, and work on concrete outside containment.

“The Contractor has also encountered difficulties in ensuring that new vendors produce high-quality, compliant components per the IPS projections.” (p.15)

Georgia Power is now indicating that it has little faith in the contractor’s ability to keep to the new delayed timetable.

“The Contractor’s schedule performance on critical path work such as concrete placements to start shield building installation and inside containment installation are challenges to the Contractor’s ability to adhere to the revised IPS.

“The Contractor must continue to improve its schedule performance, maintain these improvements, and successfully resolve RCPs / squib valves / CMTs (components with severe quality or delivery problems) in order to complete the Facility by the currently projected substantial completion dates.” (p.15)

China’s AP1000s – a three year construction delay

Cost data from the Chinese construction projects is difficult to find. But they have also experienced significant construction difficulties. Building at Sanmen began construction in August 2009 and was originally expected to be finished by August 2013.

As with Vogtle, construction was said to be on schedule a year into the project and even in March 2012 completion was still officially planned for 2013. Recent updates suggests that completion will actually take place in 2016, also a three year delay.

The design used in China is simpler than that used in the US, and it may well be possible for Chinese constructors to build much more quickly and cheaply. However the modifications are unlikely to be acceptable to Western regulators. For example, the power stations are not designed to survive a direct hit from an airliner, a US requirement.

The questions in the minds of all concerned are surely these:

  • How many of the problems at Vogtle, Summer and elsewhere are inherent to the construction of a large third generation nuclear power station?
  • And how many simply arise because these are ‘first of a kind’ projects?
  • Will new nuclear projects around the world avoid the major problems that have affected the first eight AP1000s because the construction companies have learnt how to build these huge projects more efficiently?
  • Or is a safe third generation nuclear power station beyond the capacity of even the most experienced contractors to build to a tight timetable and at a predictable cost?

I’m afraid I don’t think the answer is at all clear.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change and valued contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was originally published on Carbon Commentary.

Also on The Ecologist:Toshiba’s nuclear project – cheaper than Hinkley C?

 






Nugen’s AP1000 nuclear reactor – is it any better than the EPR?





The engineering problems of the EPR are well-known.

The nuclear power stations being built in Finland and France using this design are well over budget, are failing to meet even frequently revised timetables and are dogged with concerns over construction integrity.

Olkiluoto 3 in Finland is now expected to start producing electricity in 2018, thirteen years after work first began on the site. The project will cost many billions of Euros more than first predicted.

Despite these highly visible problems, warnings that the design is “unconstructable” and the new legal challenges from Austria and from green energy suppliers in Germany and Austria, EDF still wants to construct Hinkley C using the EPR design.

Others have suggested that an alternative design, Westinghouse’s AP1000, has a better future in the UK. Three of the reactors are planned for the Moorside proposed nuclear site next to Sellafield. Chinese reactor builders are also touting AP1000 variants for the UK’s Bradwell nuclear site, and even for Hinkley C should the EDF / Areva consortium withdraw.

An uncritical article in the Financial Times this week allowed the Westinghouse consortium a chance to expound on the strengths of the AP1000 design. The head of Nugen, the UK venture promoting the Westinghouse design, said: “We are using proven technology. The AP1000 has a good record of construction around the world.”

The facts suggest that these statements are lamentably false. Unfortunately for those of us who believe new nuclear should be a response to the increasingly urgent need to decarbonise electricity production, Westinghouse is having the same problems with the AP1000 as the unconstructible EPR.

AP1000 – a bundle of trouble?

The AP1000 is the next generation design being developed by Westinghouse, a subsidiary of Toshiba. Westinghouse constructs the AP1000 projects in partnership with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), probably the world’s most experienced builder of large power stations.

The AP1000 is a 1.1 GW plant using a design based on a much smaller power station developed by Westinghouse 20 years ago. One important fact is that no stations using the original design were ever built. However, the advantages of the AP1000 are said to include a relatively simple design, a high level of passive safety and modular construction.

Modular construction means that components can be manufactured elsewhere and then shipped to the power station site. However US sites have had 5,000 workers on site at the same time, posing the some of the same huge management challenges that were experienced at the Finnish EPR site.

Four AP1000 reactors are in construction in the US and four in China. The US plants are at two separate sites in the state of Georgia (‘Plant Vogtle’, two AP1000s) and South Carolina (‘Summer’, two AP1000s).

I focus here on the experience in Georgia, but note that similar three-year delays have also happened at Summer in South Carolina, where serious cost overruns have also taken place.

Plant Vogtle – construction times more than doubled

Vogtle 3 and 4 are being built in the same complex as two earlier nuclear power stations. After delays in final design approval, they were finally licenced in February 2012. Near-concurrent construction of the two plants started in May 2013 with completion of the first planned for April 2016.

Original estimates for the total price to the utilities buying the power stations were about $14bn (about £9.5bn). The price to be paid was essentially fixed, meaning that most of the construction risk is borne by Westinghouse and CB&I.

The most recent announcement of construction delays came in February 2015 when the station’s eventual 45% owner (Georgia Power) told the state regulator that the partnership building the station had recently estimated that the eventual completion date for Vogtle 3 would be June 2019. Vogtle 4 would be finished in June 2020.

The expected delay for Vogtle 3 is now 39 months, more than doubling the initially expected construction time. The project is not yet half complete.

And the costs are rising too …

Although the contract price has not risen significantly because it is largely fixed, the cost to electricity customers in the state of Georgia has increased. This is because the utilities that will eventually own the two new stations have been granted electricity price increases by the state regulator to cover the higher financing costs of Vogtle 3 and 4.

The utilities have been paying for individual elements of the two new plants as they are completed. The long delays mean that the interest costs are higher than expected and the regulator has already granted rate increases to compensate the eventual owners.

People in Georgia are already paying a supplement of 6% of their bills to finance the new nuclear station – Indeed Friends of the Earth US suggests that as much as 11% of their electricity bills may be supportiing the project.

Although the deal was a fixed price contract, the company buying the largest share of the finished plants is in legal battles over extra costs that the contractors claim that the purchasers should bear.

We can reasonably expect that the cost to construct the stations has also increased. However industry estimates of the eventual final cost to the contractors are vague and imprecise. They currently seem to be around $18bn (~£12bn). This seems low to me, given that the total project is now expected to take more than twice as long as originally expected.

CB&I says that Westinghouse will eventually pay most of the overrun costs but we can safely presume that this issue will also end up in court.

Georgia Power is losing faith in its contractors

Until recently the main buyer, Georgia Power, was reasonably content with the progress of the construction. However its 2015 submissions to the Georgia regulator have become increasingly concerned in response to the latest estimates of delay.

Note that Georgia Power has a difficult line to steer: it cannot be too critical of the contractors because otherwise the regulator that oversees it and grants its rate increases will question why it agreed to build the first new nuclear plant in the US for several decades in the first place!

Most recently, the company’s May 2015 testimony prepared for a hearing has been openly critical of the contractors Westinghouse and CB&I:

“In general, the Company, like the other Owners, has been disappointed with the Contractor’s performance under the revised IPS (project plan). The Contractor has missed several key milestones since the publication of the revised IPS in January 2015, including several milestones relating to critical-path or near-critical-path activities such as the assembly of CA01 (part of the central reactor), the delivery of shield building panels, and work on concrete outside containment.

“The Contractor has also encountered difficulties in ensuring that new vendors produce high-quality, compliant components per the IPS projections.” (p.15)

Georgia Power is now indicating that it has little faith in the contractor’s ability to keep to the new delayed timetable.

“The Contractor’s schedule performance on critical path work such as concrete placements to start shield building installation and inside containment installation are challenges to the Contractor’s ability to adhere to the revised IPS.

“The Contractor must continue to improve its schedule performance, maintain these improvements, and successfully resolve RCPs / squib valves / CMTs (components with severe quality or delivery problems) in order to complete the Facility by the currently projected substantial completion dates.” (p.15)

China’s AP1000s – a three year construction delay

Cost data from the Chinese construction projects is difficult to find. But they have also experienced significant construction difficulties. Building at Sanmen began construction in August 2009 and was originally expected to be finished by August 2013.

As with Vogtle, construction was said to be on schedule a year into the project and even in March 2012 completion was still officially planned for 2013. Recent updates suggests that completion will actually take place in 2016, also a three year delay.

The design used in China is simpler than that used in the US, and it may well be possible for Chinese constructors to build much more quickly and cheaply. However the modifications are unlikely to be acceptable to Western regulators. For example, the power stations are not designed to survive a direct hit from an airliner, a US requirement.

The questions in the minds of all concerned are surely these:

  • How many of the problems at Vogtle, Summer and elsewhere are inherent to the construction of a large third generation nuclear power station?
  • And how many simply arise because these are ‘first of a kind’ projects?
  • Will new nuclear projects around the world avoid the major problems that have affected the first eight AP1000s because the construction companies have learnt how to build these huge projects more efficiently?
  • Or is a safe third generation nuclear power station beyond the capacity of even the most experienced contractors to build to a tight timetable and at a predictable cost?

I’m afraid I don’t think the answer is at all clear.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change and valued contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was originally published on Carbon Commentary.

Also on The Ecologist:Toshiba’s nuclear project – cheaper than Hinkley C?

 






Nugen’s AP1000 nuclear reactor – is it any better than the EPR?





The engineering problems of the EPR are well-known.

The nuclear power stations being built in Finland and France using this design are well over budget, are failing to meet even frequently revised timetables and are dogged with concerns over construction integrity.

Olkiluoto 3 in Finland is now expected to start producing electricity in 2018, thirteen years after work first began on the site. The project will cost many billions of Euros more than first predicted.

Despite these highly visible problems, warnings that the design is “unconstructable” and the new legal challenges from Austria and from green energy suppliers in Germany and Austria, EDF still wants to construct Hinkley C using the EPR design.

Others have suggested that an alternative design, Westinghouse’s AP1000, has a better future in the UK. Three of the reactors are planned for the Moorside proposed nuclear site next to Sellafield. Chinese reactor builders are also touting AP1000 variants for the UK’s Bradwell nuclear site, and even for Hinkley C should the EDF / Areva consortium withdraw.

An uncritical article in the Financial Times this week allowed the Westinghouse consortium a chance to expound on the strengths of the AP1000 design. The head of Nugen, the UK venture promoting the Westinghouse design, said: “We are using proven technology. The AP1000 has a good record of construction around the world.”

The facts suggest that these statements are lamentably false. Unfortunately for those of us who believe new nuclear should be a response to the increasingly urgent need to decarbonise electricity production, Westinghouse is having the same problems with the AP1000 as the unconstructible EPR.

AP1000 – a bundle of trouble?

The AP1000 is the next generation design being developed by Westinghouse, a subsidiary of Toshiba. Westinghouse constructs the AP1000 projects in partnership with Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), probably the world’s most experienced builder of large power stations.

The AP1000 is a 1.1 GW plant using a design based on a much smaller power station developed by Westinghouse 20 years ago. One important fact is that no stations using the original design were ever built. However, the advantages of the AP1000 are said to include a relatively simple design, a high level of passive safety and modular construction.

Modular construction means that components can be manufactured elsewhere and then shipped to the power station site. However US sites have had 5,000 workers on site at the same time, posing the some of the same huge management challenges that were experienced at the Finnish EPR site.

Four AP1000 reactors are in construction in the US and four in China. The US plants are at two separate sites in the state of Georgia (‘Plant Vogtle’, two AP1000s) and South Carolina (‘Summer’, two AP1000s).

I focus here on the experience in Georgia, but note that similar three-year delays have also happened at Summer in South Carolina, where serious cost overruns have also taken place.

Plant Vogtle – construction times more than doubled

Vogtle 3 and 4 are being built in the same complex as two earlier nuclear power stations. After delays in final design approval, they were finally licenced in February 2012. Near-concurrent construction of the two plants started in May 2013 with completion of the first planned for April 2016.

Original estimates for the total price to the utilities buying the power stations were about $14bn (about £9.5bn). The price to be paid was essentially fixed, meaning that most of the construction risk is borne by Westinghouse and CB&I.

The most recent announcement of construction delays came in February 2015 when the station’s eventual 45% owner (Georgia Power) told the state regulator that the partnership building the station had recently estimated that the eventual completion date for Vogtle 3 would be June 2019. Vogtle 4 would be finished in June 2020.

The expected delay for Vogtle 3 is now 39 months, more than doubling the initially expected construction time. The project is not yet half complete.

And the costs are rising too …

Although the contract price has not risen significantly because it is largely fixed, the cost to electricity customers in the state of Georgia has increased. This is because the utilities that will eventually own the two new stations have been granted electricity price increases by the state regulator to cover the higher financing costs of Vogtle 3 and 4.

The utilities have been paying for individual elements of the two new plants as they are completed. The long delays mean that the interest costs are higher than expected and the regulator has already granted rate increases to compensate the eventual owners.

People in Georgia are already paying a supplement of 6% of their bills to finance the new nuclear station – Indeed Friends of the Earth US suggests that as much as 11% of their electricity bills may be supportiing the project.

Although the deal was a fixed price contract, the company buying the largest share of the finished plants is in legal battles over extra costs that the contractors claim that the purchasers should bear.

We can reasonably expect that the cost to construct the stations has also increased. However industry estimates of the eventual final cost to the contractors are vague and imprecise. They currently seem to be around $18bn (~£12bn). This seems low to me, given that the total project is now expected to take more than twice as long as originally expected.

CB&I says that Westinghouse will eventually pay most of the overrun costs but we can safely presume that this issue will also end up in court.

Georgia Power is losing faith in its contractors

Until recently the main buyer, Georgia Power, was reasonably content with the progress of the construction. However its 2015 submissions to the Georgia regulator have become increasingly concerned in response to the latest estimates of delay.

Note that Georgia Power has a difficult line to steer: it cannot be too critical of the contractors because otherwise the regulator that oversees it and grants its rate increases will question why it agreed to build the first new nuclear plant in the US for several decades in the first place!

Most recently, the company’s May 2015 testimony prepared for a hearing has been openly critical of the contractors Westinghouse and CB&I:

“In general, the Company, like the other Owners, has been disappointed with the Contractor’s performance under the revised IPS (project plan). The Contractor has missed several key milestones since the publication of the revised IPS in January 2015, including several milestones relating to critical-path or near-critical-path activities such as the assembly of CA01 (part of the central reactor), the delivery of shield building panels, and work on concrete outside containment.

“The Contractor has also encountered difficulties in ensuring that new vendors produce high-quality, compliant components per the IPS projections.” (p.15)

Georgia Power is now indicating that it has little faith in the contractor’s ability to keep to the new delayed timetable.

“The Contractor’s schedule performance on critical path work such as concrete placements to start shield building installation and inside containment installation are challenges to the Contractor’s ability to adhere to the revised IPS.

“The Contractor must continue to improve its schedule performance, maintain these improvements, and successfully resolve RCPs / squib valves / CMTs (components with severe quality or delivery problems) in order to complete the Facility by the currently projected substantial completion dates.” (p.15)

China’s AP1000s – a three year construction delay

Cost data from the Chinese construction projects is difficult to find. But they have also experienced significant construction difficulties. Building at Sanmen began construction in August 2009 and was originally expected to be finished by August 2013.

As with Vogtle, construction was said to be on schedule a year into the project and even in March 2012 completion was still officially planned for 2013. Recent updates suggests that completion will actually take place in 2016, also a three year delay.

The design used in China is simpler than that used in the US, and it may well be possible for Chinese constructors to build much more quickly and cheaply. However the modifications are unlikely to be acceptable to Western regulators. For example, the power stations are not designed to survive a direct hit from an airliner, a US requirement.

The questions in the minds of all concerned are surely these:

  • How many of the problems at Vogtle, Summer and elsewhere are inherent to the construction of a large third generation nuclear power station?
  • And how many simply arise because these are ‘first of a kind’ projects?
  • Will new nuclear projects around the world avoid the major problems that have affected the first eight AP1000s because the construction companies have learnt how to build these huge projects more efficiently?
  • Or is a safe third generation nuclear power station beyond the capacity of even the most experienced contractors to build to a tight timetable and at a predictable cost?

I’m afraid I don’t think the answer is at all clear.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change and valued contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was originally published on Carbon Commentary.

Also on The Ecologist:Toshiba’s nuclear project – cheaper than Hinkley C?