Monthly Archives: June 2016

The Midsummer Bonfire: Brexit and Podemos

Every June 23rd, la noche de San Juan, people across Spain observe Midsummer with bonfires, music and dancing, a pre-Christian tradition that’s still celebrated in many parts of Europe (though not, alas, in the UK). The celebration in our tiny village in Cantabria, on the rugged, green north coast, was modest-a small fire in the garden, a few friends, toasted marshmallows, a bit of music, and a ritual burning of things we want to be rid of. Just before going to bed I threw a piece of card with the word #BREXIT into the flames, wishing for the whole business to go away. It was a symbolic ballot, the only kind I could cast since, as a British expat (should I now say “Brexpat”?) of more than 15 years, I’m no longer entitled to vote in my native land.

I woke early, sweating, from a dream in which Leave had won, and went downstairs to make sure that it had only been a midsummer night’s dream, only to discover that, on the contrary, Brexit was the opening act of a tragedy worthy of Shakespeare at his peak: horrible to watch, yet you can’t tear your eyes away from the stage, the slide into chaos as compelling as it is inexorable. The plot was straight out of King Lear. A vain king asks three rash questions [Cameron’s three referendums, if that isn’t blatantly obvious], and the third time, he doesn’t get the answer he wants, it tears the whole kingdom apart.

I was deeply shocked, like so many people-including the Leave voters who thought it was just a protest vote because Remain was bound to win, and the young people who couldn’t be bothered to vote, and woke to find their elders had just voted away their European identity.

I’m 46 now; I was 22 in 1992, the year the Maastricht treaty was signed, creating the EU, and I remember feeling disoriented at the time, as if my country had been taken away overnight and replaced by something new, unfamiliar, bigger, more diverse. Something called the European Union. In the Brexit referendum, it makes perfect sense to me that people my age or older-people who in 1992 were over 21, with their identity already established-mostly voted Leave, and those younger than me mostly voted Remain. And, of course, the places with the strongest links to Europe voted to stay-London, the multicultural capital; Scotland, with its “auld alliance”; Northern Ireland, which, uniquely in the UK, shares a border with another Member State.

But as for the rest of England and Wales, I was dismayed by just how hard the Leave message had hit home. Not just in desperately poor places, either. My home district of Warwick was the only place in the whole West Midlands that voted Remain. Birmingham, Coventry-hell, even Stratford-upon-Avon, one of the world’s biggest tourist towns, the global reference point I have spent twenty years telling foreigners I come from, voted (narrowly) to Leave! In Devon, the county that I see as a spiritual home, only Exeter and trendy Totnes (South Hams district) voted Remain.

Perhaps the harsh reality was that, all my life, I had only half-known the land of my birth. Being half American, I’d never felt 100% as if I belonged, and it wasn’t a big step from there to feeling that England, with its class obsessions, political constipation, imperial pretensions, and its quiet desperation, was a prison I needed to escape. But it was still home, it wasn’t that far away, and I’d always be able to go back, wouldn’t I?

Wouldn’t I?

Three days after the referendum, with the shock of Brexit still raw, and the trolls who’d brought it on back in hiding under their bridges, Spain held its own election. Bad timing or what? Of course, I was supporting Unidos Podemos, but once again, I couldn’t vote, since I have never felt Spanish enough to apply for a passport, nor-until the rise of Podemos-seen any particular reason to vote for any of the parties.

Five years ago, in May 2011, when the indignados of the 15M occupied the plazas to demand Real Democracy Now, I was cheering them on. Down at the Plaza Arriaga in Bilbao I bumped into a friend who said he thought the indignados should start a new political party. I was cynical then, and said you couldn’t put a forest into a filing cabinet, but I was wrong. Five years on, that movement has captured the town halls of Spain’s biggest cities, and now, six months after the stalemate election in December, the new party looked poised to leapfrog the Socialists and become the party of government.

Yet most people I knew were hardly enthusiastic about the prospect. They couldn’t believe that Podemos was any less elitist than the established parties; what was the point of replacing la casta (the clique) with a neo-casta? What if the top brass of Podemos were just another bunch of politicos jockeying to surf to power on a wave of other people’s revolutionary zeal? Wherever there is a microphone there will be people who are good at grabbing it and holding onto it; and the people who started hogging the microphones at the 15M in 2011 are, in many cases, still holding them.

Who knows, in the end, whether it was that ambivalence and distrust, or the entrenched power structures of the main parties, or fear of post-Brexit instability, or the disenfranchisement of young emigrants, or the general unreliability of the voting system (which I can vouch for, having once been called to serve as president of an electoral college in Bilbao; we can certainly assume some vote-fixing, according to the unbreakable rule of politics that if a system can be corrupted, it will be) or whether it was just that Pablo Iglesias himself failed to light a spark, coming over as a clever-dick politics lecturer with no real-world experience. But whatever the reason, now, after another election, Spain is back where it was six months ago, with parliamentary deadlock and no clear way forward.

Hopes not crushed but not fulfilled either, back to normality. The political revolution, or change of guard, as you wish, has taken root in the well-connected cities and regions-Podemos won the most representatives in the Basque Country and Catalunya-but it certainly hasn’t reached into deepest Spain. Here in Cantabria, the Partido Popular won the most votes in 96 out of 102 municipalities, with only the PSOE for relief, and the same happened right across the rural centre.

While the parties in Madrid are warming over their boring, fruitless negotiations of last winter, across the bay of Biscay the bonfire of the British establishment rages unchecked. Without a doubt, the shock of Brexit has triggered a new global economic crisis that will unfold over the coming years, without the slightest respect for national borders. That crisis, like the last one, was bound to come sooner or later; nothing whatsoever has happened to make the global financial and political system more stable or sustainable since 2008; and the crisis will unfold whether or not Parliament gets an act together to invoke Article 50 and formally leave the EU this year, next year, sometime or never. The week since the referendum has seen the collapse of the pound, the Labour party and the England football team; whatever next?

But just as it takes a very special nation to lose at football to a squad of part-timers from a volcanic island with less than 1% of your population, it takes a very special nation to vote (even if unwittingly) for its own collapse. And in a way that gives me hope. Without in any way agreeing with the liars and trolls who led the Leave campaign, I would say this: these people represent the shadow side cast by our violent, mechanized, inhuman culture, which we need to take a good hard look at, however ugly. And in the days since the referendum I’ve reluctantly and painfully come around to the view that, from an ecological perspective, the Leave result could actually be a good thing, if we can make good use of it.

Given the extreme malignancy of the global capitalist economy, maybe a managed collapse (if such a thing is even possible) gives us the best chance to save what we can of our precious ecological and cultural heritage. When a month’s worth of rain falls on London-specifically-on referendum day, perhaps it can serve as a reminder that Gaia may not be allowed a vote, but she does have interests, which we urgently need to make coincide with our own-because she is the one we are burning on our bonfire of the ages.

The Author:

Robert is one of the New Voices team now joining the Ecologist platform to bring a different perspective to the issues we are all facing. Here’s what he says about himself:

Robert Alcock is a writer, ecological designer and activist based in northern Spain.

His work includes two books, The Island that Never Was: An English castaway in Bilbao http://abrazohouse.org/island and Abrazo House: Learning in nature http://abrazohouse.org/book

Twitter: @AbrazoHouse

 

 

 

 

 

The Brexit con: the exit Britain needs is from neoliberal capitalism

Britain can leave the European Union, but it would remain just as tied to capitalist markets as before.

The decision to leave the EU is not a decision to leave the world capitalist system, or even disengage from Europe.

It is thus is not a decision that will lead to any additional ‘independence’ or ‘sovereignty’ outside of proponents’ imaginations.

What has been unleashed is the nationalism and xenophobia of right-wing ‘populism’ – those on the Left celebrating a blow against elites might pause for thought.

Yes, voting in defiance of what elites told them to do played its part in favor of a British exit from the EU, but nationalism, scapegoating of immigrants, and convincing people at the mercy of corporate power that less regulation is in their interest were dominant.

It is the far Right that been given a shot in the arm from Brexit – from the National Front in France and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the hard right within the Conservative Party. The Labour Party’s Blairites have also been emboldened, as the parliamentary coup against Jeremy Corbyn illustrates.

EU single market is a corporate ‘free trade’ project

By no means is the above survey meant as any defense of the EU. It is a neoliberal project from top to bottom, an anti-democratic exercise in raw corporate power to strip Europeans of the gains and protections hard won over two generations.

The EU has a similar function to the North American Free Trade Agreement on the other side of the Atlantic. European capitalists desire the ability to challenge the United States for economic supremacy, but cannot do so without the combined clout of a united continent.

This wish underlies the anti-democratic push to steadily tighten the EU, including mandatory national budget benchmarks that require cutting social safety nets and forcing policies designed to break down solidarity among wage earners across borders by imposing harsher competition through imposed austerity.

So we should be celebrating anything that weakens the EU, yes? Perhaps. If this were the first blow to a visibly crumbling edifice, then surely yes. If there were a continental Left with a clear alternative vision to corporate globalization, then emphatically yes. But neither of these conditions are in force, so a more cautious response is called for. What is really needed is the destruction of the EU, for all countries to leave it, not only one.

Britain leaving by itself will lead to far less of a change than Brexit proponents hope, and not necessarily for the better. This is so because the conditions of capitalist competition will remain untouched.

Norway and Switzerland are out – but are really in

Brexit proponents point to Norway and Switzerland as models of countries outside the EU but which retain trading access. But what those countries have is the responsibilities of EU membership without having any say.

Norway has the closer relationship of the two. Norway (along with Iceland and the micro-state of Lichtenstein) is part of the European Economic Area, essentially an agreement tightly binding those three countries to the EU. The EEA has been described as a ‘transmission belt’ whereby the EU ensures that the EEA countries adopt EU laws as the price for being a part of the ‘free trade’ area of the EU. That is a one-way transmission. Norway has no say in the creation of any EU laws and regulations.

The EEA treaty calls for Norwegian consultation, but Norway is not represented in any EU body. The agreement allows Norway to ‘suspend’ any EU law that is disliked, but Norway has done so only once. By contrast, Norway’s parliament has approved EU legislation 287 times, most of them unanimously. This loss of sovereignty does not seem to be an issue for Norway’s political leaders. A 2012 Norwegian review of EEA membership concludes:

“This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making processes that have direct consequences for Norway, and neither do we have any significant influence on them. … [O]ur form of association with the EU dampens political engagement and debate in Norway and makes it difficult to monitor the government and hold it accountable for its European policy.”

The chair of the review committee noted that “There is no upside for Norwegian politicians to engage in European policy. … Because politicians are not interested in European policies, the media are not interested, and lack of media interest reinforces the lack of politicians’ interest.”

The minister of European Affairs in the current Conservative Party-led Norwegian government, Elisabeth Aspaker, confirms government ease with adaptation to EU law. Norway, in fact, has committed to voluntarily contribute €2.8 billion in aid to poorer EU countries for the period 2014 to 2021. In an interview with EurActiv, Minister Aspaker said:

“[W]e believe this is in our interest to improve social and economic cohesion in Europe. If Europe is doing well, Norway will also be doing well. If Europe is doing poorly or is destabilised, this will have a negative impact on Norway and the Norwegian economy. So this is why we believe we should involve ourselves beyond what is required under the EEA agreement.”

Switzerland has a separate agreement with the EU that is essentially a ‘free trade’ agreement. Switzerland has a little bit of room to not adopt EU laws, but some of its goods are blocked from export to EU countries as a result. Switzerland, however, is under pressure to do as the EU dictates, and not only does Berne not have representation, it lacks even the toothless consultation that Oslo has.

Britain will still pay but have no say

Will Britain really be free of transfers to Brussels as the Leave campaign, dominated by the Tory right and UKIP, loudly claimed before the referendum?

Their immediate back-tracking on that, and on their implied promise of significantly reduced immigration, provides an important clue. The Centre for European Reform, a neoliberal think tank that declares itself in favor of European integration, in a nonetheless sober analysis declares that Britain would pay a substantial amount to retain its access to European markets. In its report, ‘Outsiders on the inside: Swiss and Norwegian lessons for the UK’, the Centre writes:

“Britain would also have to pay a financial price, as well as a political price, for retaining access to the single market. As a relatively rich country, it would presumably be expected to pay special contributions to EU cohesion and aid programmes on a similar basis [as] the Norwegians and Swiss do.

“Currently, Norway contributes €340m a year to the EU. If multiplied by 12 for Britain’s much larger population, that rate would imply a contribution for the UK of just over €4 billion, or nearly half its current net contribution to the EU budget as a full member. That is a lot to pay for associate status of the club.”

It is possible to grumble that the foregoing is a product of a pro-EU perspective, but doing so would ignore that Britain’s firm place in the world capitalist system, geographical location and trading patterns dictate that it retain its commercial access to Europe.

A post-Brexit Britain’s remittances to Brussels might be larger than even that postulated by the Centre for European Reform. An Open Europe analysis calculates that Norway’s net contribution to the EU works out to €107 per person, while Britain’s current contribution is €139 per person. It may not be realistic to expect a future British contribution to be substantially less than Norway’s.

Furthermore, the Open Europe analysis notes that gross immigration to Britain is significantly less than that of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Those countries each must accept the free flow of people (along with goods, services and capital) the same as any EU member. The scare tactics of UKIP and the Tory right were simply that, tactics.

And the promise by Brexit proponents of the return of an golden age and the scare tactics of Brexit opponents that financial armeggedon would be at hand? A separate Open Europe report finds the most likely range of change to British GDP would be within minus 0.8% to plus 0.6% by 2030.

Not much of a change. The high end of that modest range assumes that Britain adopts “unilateral liberalisation” with all its major trading partners because “free trade” offers the “greatest benefit”, the Open Europe report asserts. But studies purporting to demonstrating the benefits of ‘free trade’ agreements tend to wildly overstate their casethrough specious assumptions.

These often start with models that assume liberalization can not cause or worsen employment, capital flight or trade imbalances, and that capital and labor will smoothly shift to new productive uses under seamless market forces.

Thus groups like the Peterson Institute invariably come up with rosy projections for ‘free trade’ agreements, including fantasy figures for the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership that ignore the reality of job losses and resulting downward drag on wages. So it is perhaps not a surprise that the rosiest prediction here is for Britain to throw itself wide open to world markets, as if Britain wasn’t already one of the most de-regulated countries in the global North.

There are lies, and then there are damned lies

A different sort of lack of realism pervaded the Brexit campaign, and their avowed desire to remain in the European single market surely has something to do with their rapid backtracking.

Boris Johnson, a leading spokesperson for Brexit and a possible successor to David Cameron, certainly was far more cautious in his post-vote June 26th column in The Telegraph than during the campaign.

He claimed, in the face of all evidence, that immigration fears were not a campaign factor, that the British economy is “outstandingly strong” and “nothing changes” except for a goodbye to European bureaucracy. Seldom do we see so much undisguised lying in a single article.

The response from the other side of the English Channel is illuminating. A commentary inDer Spiegel, undoubtedly reflecting official thinking in Germany, concludes by declaring, “The British have chosen out, and now they must face the consequences”, given with a favorable reference to hard-line Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. The Guardian, quoting an assortment of European diplomats, provided this report:

” ‘It is a pipe dream,’ said [one] EU diplomat. ‘You cannot have full access to the single market and not accept its rules. If we gave that kind of deal to the UK, then why not to Australia or New Zealand. It would be a free-for-all.’ A second EU diplomat said: ‘There are no preferences, there are principles and the principle is no pick and choose.’

“The diplomat stressed that participating in the single market meant accepting EU rules, including the jurisdiction of the European court of justice, monitoring by the European commission and accepting the primacy of EU law over national law – conditions that will be anathema to leave advocates who campaigned on the mantra ‘take back control.'”

No wonder no Tory seems eager to start negotiations. Perhaps ‘more of the same but with less say’ will not meet the expectations of those who voted for a British exit from the EU. Certainly, corporate ideology has done its job well of convincing some that corporations abandoning communities isn’t the fault of the corporations leaving nor the capitalism that rewards those abandonments.

Consider this passage in The New York Times on June 28, quoting a blue-collar worker in an English city that voted heavily to leave: ” ‘All the industries, everything, has gone,’ said Michael Wake, 55, forklift operator, gesturing toward Roker Beach, once black from the soot of the shipyards. ‘We were powerful, strong. But Brussels and the government, they’ve taken it all away.’ “

Capitalism rules …

Of course, the ceaseless competitive pressure of capitalism, ever ready to move to the place with the lowest wages and weakest regulations, is responsible for the hollowing out of Sunderland, England, and so many industrial cities like it.

Britain adhering to EU rules on unrestricted mobility of capital as the price of retaining its European trade links will have exactly zero effect on that dynamic, and British entry into ‘free trade’ agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or similar deals will accelerate it.

Governments sign such agreements, true, but they are acting under compulsion of powerful industrialists and financiers within and without their borders, conceding ever more sovereignty to multi-national capital as the price of remaining ‘competitive.’

The EU is a bonanza for multi-national corporations and an autocratic disaster for working people across Europe. But one country leaving and agreeing to the same terms as an ‘outsider’ will effect no change whatsoever.

An exit from capitalism is what the world needs, not from this or that capitalist treaty.

 


 

Pete Dolack is an activist, writer, poet and photographer, and writes on Systemic Disorder. His book ‘It’s Not Over: Lessons from the Socialist Experiment‘, a study of attempts to create societies on a basis other than capitalism, has just been published by Zero Books.

This article was originally published on Systemic Disorder.

 

 

Brexit curse hits nuclear power, new London runway

The shock waves felt round the world at the UK’s decision in a referendum to leave the European Union will have unexpected consequences for some major projects linked to climate change.

Plans for four giant nuclear reactors to be built in England by the French are almost certain to be scrapped because opposition among trade unions in France has hardened since last week’s vote.

A second major project – a third runway at Heathrow, London’s busiest airport – was due to be given the go-ahead on 7 July, but that decision is almost certain to be postponed. Boris Johnson, a leading contender to succeed David Cameron as Conservative prime minister, is vehemently opposed to the proposed runway.

The decision by 51.9% of UK voters to reject continued EU membership was partly about immigration, but also a revolt against regulations from Brussels, which some saw as oppressive.

These regulations include targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to improve air quality. And although none of these was actively discussed during the referendum campaign, the UK now has an opportunity to write its own rules on climate change and will not be bound by the EU targets on renewables, energy efficiency and emissions reduction.

Freed from EU climate and energy targets?

With the rightwing politicians firmly in charge in the Conservative party after the Brexit vote, it is unlikely that halting global warming or cleaning up car emissions will be among their priorities.

The EU has three key climate targets: a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions from their 1990 levels by 2020; 20% of energy to come from renewables by the same date; and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.

All 28 member states were involved in agreeing the targets, but the UK – along with Germany – played a greater role than some other states because its industrial base is shrinking and it has vast potential for offshore wind power and other renewables.

These longer-term problems for the UK are not currently on the agenda because they are dwarfed by the immediate political crisis. The two major parties, Conservative and Labour, are in the midst of leadership battles, and until these are decided there is a policy vacuum.

When they will be resolved is anyone’s guess, but time is rolling by and Électricité de France (EDF) is due to make a ‘final investment decision’ in September to build two 1,650 MW nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point in southwest England. They were expected to be followed by two more to the east of London.

Time for the ‘coup de grace’

The Hinkley decision, already postponed repeatedly, has been in doubt for months because of the parlous financial state of EDF and the increasing opposition of a group of French trade unions, whose members fear that the building of nuclear power stations in the UK would divert much-needed investment away from home.

There are also question marks about whether the nuclear design is viable at all, since construction delays and cost over-runs have dogged the prototypes, and none is yet producing electricity.

The backlash against the British decision to leave the EU will not affect the decision, according to the immediate reaction from EDF and the French government, but the chances of the scheme being given the go-ahead in September now seem remote.

Mycle Schneider, an independent nuclear and energy industry analyst based in Paris, says that the Brexit vote would hand EDF “the perfect occasion to pull the plug on Hinkley Point without losing face”. He believes that the Brexit vote represents a “disaster” for EDF’s plan, and that a decision to press ahead with Hinkley Point is unimaginable at the moment.

Angus Brendan MacNeil, chairman of the UK’s House of Commons energy and climate select committee, and a Scottish National Party Member of Parliament, says that the scheme is “bedevilled by uncertainty”. Until last week, EDF was investing in the UK as another EU member state, but that is no longer the case.

Can’t pay, won’t pay?

Until the Brexit vote, the UK government was committed to building 10 new nuclear power stations as part of its ‘low carbon’ plan for the energy sector. The programme always seemed improbable, given the state of the nuclear industry worldwide, but getting private investors to support such a policy now seems even less likely.

One of the unlooked-for side-effects of the decision is to take the UK outside the Euratom Treaty that safeguards nuclear materials from misuse. Since the UK has the largest stock of plutonium in the world, and a large trade in nuclear materials with Europe, the US and Japan, this creates serious problems over who now regulates the industry.

Meanwhile, the Heathrow runway decision might benefit from being freed from the EU air pollution rules aimed at preventing air quality around the airport continuing to breach World Health Organisation safety limits as it expands.

On the other hand, with the UK outside the European Union, demand for air travel might drop, undermining the business case for a new runway. 

 


 

Paul Brown writes for Climate News Network, where this article was originally published.

 

Higher fuel bills, less renewables, an end to nuclear power: Brexit’s energy shakeout

The large devaluation of the last few days will have significant effects on UK energy, from electricity to motor fuels. Other changes are also likely to slow decarbonisation of the economy.

Hinkley Point C is even less likely to be built.  As at the point of writing, the pound is down about 16% against both the dollar and the Euro compared to twelve months ago. That means that all the components for the power station purchased outside the UK will be 16% more expensive.

EdF has indicated in the past that “up to 57%” of the cost of Hinkley will be spent on UK goods and services. Let’s be a little sceptical and say that only half the cost of the new nuclear plant will be incurred in the UK.

The last estimate we saw was that constructing Hinkley was going to absorb £18bn. If half of that cost is derived from imported components and other charges the exchange rate decline over the last year has added over £1.4bn to the bill. Much of that has been in the last few days.

The electricity that Hinkley generates will be no more valuable to EdF than before. The strike price of £92.50 a megawatt hour does not rise in the event of a UK devaluation. So the prospective financial return to EdF and the Chinese shareholders has fallen sharply.

Perhaps as importantly, the position may get worse if the decline in the value of the pound continues but nobody can know this in advance, nor can it be fully hedged against.

Now all the UK’s nuclear projects will be more expensive

The same argument applies to all other prospective nuclear construction in the UK. Put at its simplest, the components for nuclear power stations will largely be shipped into the UK and then assembled here. The rapid devaluation that is going on has made all future projects more expensive. Nuclear fuel (costing about $5 for a megawatt hour’s worth of uranium) will also become more costly.

There is a counter-argument. If Brexit pushes interest rates in the UK even lower – and the signs are that this is happening – EdF may be prepared to take a lower return on its capital than would previously have been the case.

Rumours have suggested that EdF’s financial projections were based on a 9% cost of capital. We could argue that this number is too high; UK utilities generally run on a 6% estimate. However there is no sign yet that either EdF, the French government, or Hinkley’s Chinese backers are prepared to accept a lower return.

Lastly, as at Monday midday, EdF’s shares have fallen 20% since the Thursday referendum. EdF’s total stock market value is now less than the cost of Hinkley, a position seen earlier in the year but from which the company had been climbing out of. Investors see profoundly bad effects on EdF from Brexit.

Gas bills likely to rise around 10%

Gas fired power stations are relatively cheap to build and operate. (Perhaps £600-£700m for a gigawatt of capacity, or about a tenth the price of new nuclear). Fuel is the most important part of the costs they face. The price of gas is set in an increasingly international market.

Although contracts in the gas market are set in sterling, the underlying global price set in US dollars feeds into the UK’s auctions. Devaluation will therefore add sharply to the cost of buying gas for power generation. This will force up the long-run price of electricity because developers of new power stations will need guarantees of higher prices before they build their plants.

My rough calculation is that the wholesale price of electricity will need to be about 10% higher as a result of the events of the last few days. The price that homes pay for gas will be equally adversely affected.

If these increases do directly feed through to household bills, the immediate impact will be about £100 per home. People will also see inflation in the costs of goods and services they buy because their suppliers will also face higher costs of energy.

Those of us over fifty will remember this phenomenon clearly: large devaluations push up prices. The referendum decision will significantly affect the least prosperous because more of their income is spent on heat and electricity than wealthier groups. Fuel poverty will probably rise, possibly sharply. This will tend to affect worst those most likely to have voted to leave.

Petrol prices will start creeping up

The oil price has been gradually recovering after the sub $30 lows seen earlier in the year. Today, the cost of a barrel is bobbing around $50. But a dollar is now 15% more costly to those buying in British pounds than it was a year ago.

The price of petrol will therefore also rise although the percentage impact is softened by the fact that more than half the cost of a litre of fuel is composed of duty, VAT and UK denominated costs. Nevertheless, we’ll see a visible jump in fuel prices in the next few weeks.

The cost position of the UK North Sea will be improved, making it slightly easier for offshore oil and gas rigs to stay in business.

Will the rise in the price of oil help the sales of electric cars? It depends. In my view, the rise in renewables will in the longer run force down electricity prices all around the world. The economics of buying and operating an electric car will tend to get better as time goes as by, Brexit or not. Short term relative prices changes in petrol and electricity costs have little impact.

Renewables – priced in Euros, offshore wind will get more costly

The impact on renewables is slightly more nuanced. In the case of solar, withdrawal from the EU would mean that the UK could escape from the ‘Minimum Import Price’ facing Chinese companies. The price of solar modules would fall in Euro terms.

But because the Euro is now more valuable than it was a week ago, the impact in pounds would be much less. Perhaps the price of Chinese panels will be higher than it would have been without the devaluation and prospective exit from the EU.

Other system components, such as inverters, will also rise in price. Because over 80% of the cost of a large solar field is imported (my guess – better estimates welcome), PV will become much more costly, at least temporarily.

In the case of wind, more of the manufacturing value is added in the UK than in the case of solar. Perhaps they now regret it, but some of the large offshore turbine makers have factories and installation operations here. The UK should become an even more important centre for wind turbine construction as a result of devaluation.

However this optimism is only justified if we believe that the UK will be able to export to major markets without substantial tariff impediment. As of today, this is no certainty.

A large fraction of the total costs of offshore wind farms are denominated in Euros. The fall in the value of the pound will make developing large wind areas, such as those on Dogger Bank, more expensive. This will reduce the pace of offshore wind development, perhaps substantially.

Energy R&D

Places like Culham and Harwell, the UK’s energy research centres in Oxfordshire, will diminish sharply in size and importance. The nuclear fusion lab at Culham gets £55m a year from the EU, a large fraction of its budget.

As importantly, research into the conversion of surplus electricity into gas and liquid fuels that can be stored for months will be slowed. As PV and batteries becomes ever cheaper globally, this is the last remaining challenge for the clear energy revolution and the UK had been in a commanding position because of its world-leading role in biochemistry.

The Brexit vote is a huge setback for research in this area.

A right-wing government hostile to renewables?

More generally, of course, any new Conservative government will be profoundly sceptical about climate change. The part of the human brain that determines whether one is a denialist or a climate alarmist is the same as that which provided the opinion on the EU. So renewable and low-carbon energies of all types will be under threat as a result of the likely rightward shift of the government.

For example, the Vote Leave campaign literature railed about wickedness of the Large Combustion Plant Directive, the EU’s coordinated plan for reducing air pollution by forcing older coal-fired power stations to close. The LCPD was actually one of the undoubted successes of the EU energy and environment policy.

The implication is that the Leave people will be happy to see coal back as a major contributor to power supplies even though they also threw about the accusation that the EU had “tied our hands on decarbonisation”. That last complaint is about as far from the truth as is possible to get.

The primary conclusion I take from the events since the referendum is that energy is going to become more expensive in relation to household incomes, at least for a few years, and that the low-carbon transition in the UK will be slowed – partly by the impact of devaluation and loss of funding but also because of the rise in uncertainty over the future direction of energy policy.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change, and a frequent contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was first published on Carbon Commentary. His new book on the global rise of solar PV and energy storage, The Switch, will be published next week by Profile Books.

 

Higher fuel bills, less renewables, an end to nuclear power: Brexit’s energy shakeout

The large devaluation of the last few days will have significant effects on UK energy, from electricity to motor fuels. Other changes are also likely to slow decarbonisation of the economy.

Hinkley Point C is even less likely to be built.  As at the point of writing, the pound is down about 16% against both the dollar and the Euro compared to twelve months ago. That means that all the components for the power station purchased outside the UK will be 16% more expensive.

EdF has indicated in the past that “up to 57%” of the cost of Hinkley will be spent on UK goods and services. Let’s be a little sceptical and say that only half the cost of the new nuclear plant will be incurred in the UK.

The last estimate we saw was that constructing Hinkley was going to absorb £18bn. If half of that cost is derived from imported components and other charges the exchange rate decline over the last year has added over £1.4bn to the bill. Much of that has been in the last few days.

The electricity that Hinkley generates will be no more valuable to EdF than before. The strike price of £92.50 a megawatt hour does not rise in the event of a UK devaluation. So the prospective financial return to EdF and the Chinese shareholders has fallen sharply.

Perhaps as importantly, the position may get worse if the decline in the value of the pound continues but nobody can know this in advance, nor can it be fully hedged against.

Now all the UK’s nuclear projects will be more expensive

The same argument applies to all other prospective nuclear construction in the UK. Put at its simplest, the components for nuclear power stations will largely be shipped into the UK and then assembled here. The rapid devaluation that is going on has made all future projects more expensive. Nuclear fuel (costing about $5 for a megawatt hour’s worth of uranium) will also become more costly.

There is a counter-argument. If Brexit pushes interest rates in the UK even lower – and the signs are that this is happening – EdF may be prepared to take a lower return on its capital than would previously have been the case.

Rumours have suggested that EdF’s financial projections were based on a 9% cost of capital. We could argue that this number is too high; UK utilities generally run on a 6% estimate. However there is no sign yet that either EdF, the French government, or Hinkley’s Chinese backers are prepared to accept a lower return.

Lastly, as at Monday midday, EdF’s shares have fallen 20% since the Thursday referendum. EdF’s total stock market value is now less than the cost of Hinkley, a position seen earlier in the year but from which the company had been climbing out of. Investors see profoundly bad effects on EdF from Brexit.

Gas bills likely to rise around 10%

Gas fired power stations are relatively cheap to build and operate. (Perhaps £600-£700m for a gigawatt of capacity, or about a tenth the price of new nuclear). Fuel is the most important part of the costs they face. The price of gas is set in an increasingly international market.

Although contracts in the gas market are set in sterling, the underlying global price set in US dollars feeds into the UK’s auctions. Devaluation will therefore add sharply to the cost of buying gas for power generation. This will force up the long-run price of electricity because developers of new power stations will need guarantees of higher prices before they build their plants.

My rough calculation is that the wholesale price of electricity will need to be about 10% higher as a result of the events of the last few days. The price that homes pay for gas will be equally adversely affected.

If these increases do directly feed through to household bills, the immediate impact will be about £100 per home. People will also see inflation in the costs of goods and services they buy because their suppliers will also face higher costs of energy.

Those of us over fifty will remember this phenomenon clearly: large devaluations push up prices. The referendum decision will significantly affect the least prosperous because more of their income is spent on heat and electricity than wealthier groups. Fuel poverty will probably rise, possibly sharply. This will tend to affect worst those most likely to have voted to leave.

Petrol prices will start creeping up

The oil price has been gradually recovering after the sub $30 lows seen earlier in the year. Today, the cost of a barrel is bobbing around $50. But a dollar is now 15% more costly to those buying in British pounds than it was a year ago.

The price of petrol will therefore also rise although the percentage impact is softened by the fact that more than half the cost of a litre of fuel is composed of duty, VAT and UK denominated costs. Nevertheless, we’ll see a visible jump in fuel prices in the next few weeks.

The cost position of the UK North Sea will be improved, making it slightly easier for offshore oil and gas rigs to stay in business.

Will the rise in the price of oil help the sales of electric cars? It depends. In my view, the rise in renewables will in the longer run force down electricity prices all around the world. The economics of buying and operating an electric car will tend to get better as time goes as by, Brexit or not. Short term relative prices changes in petrol and electricity costs have little impact.

Renewables – priced in Euros, offshore wind will get more costly

The impact on renewables is slightly more nuanced. In the case of solar, withdrawal from the EU would mean that the UK could escape from the ‘Minimum Import Price’ facing Chinese companies. The price of solar modules would fall in Euro terms.

But because the Euro is now more valuable than it was a week ago, the impact in pounds would be much less. Perhaps the price of Chinese panels will be higher than it would have been without the devaluation and prospective exit from the EU.

Other system components, such as inverters, will also rise in price. Because over 80% of the cost of a large solar field is imported (my guess – better estimates welcome), PV will become much more costly, at least temporarily.

In the case of wind, more of the manufacturing value is added in the UK than in the case of solar. Perhaps they now regret it, but some of the large offshore turbine makers have factories and installation operations here. The UK should become an even more important centre for wind turbine construction as a result of devaluation.

However this optimism is only justified if we believe that the UK will be able to export to major markets without substantial tariff impediment. As of today, this is no certainty.

A large fraction of the total costs of offshore wind farms are denominated in Euros. The fall in the value of the pound will make developing large wind areas, such as those on Dogger Bank, more expensive. This will reduce the pace of offshore wind development, perhaps substantially.

Energy R&D

Places like Culham and Harwell, the UK’s energy research centres in Oxfordshire, will diminish sharply in size and importance. The nuclear fusion lab at Culham gets £55m a year from the EU, a large fraction of its budget.

As importantly, research into the conversion of surplus electricity into gas and liquid fuels that can be stored for months will be slowed. As PV and batteries becomes ever cheaper globally, this is the last remaining challenge for the clear energy revolution and the UK had been in a commanding position because of its world-leading role in biochemistry.

The Brexit vote is a huge setback for research in this area.

A right-wing government hostile to renewables?

More generally, of course, any new Conservative government will be profoundly sceptical about climate change. The part of the human brain that determines whether one is a denialist or a climate alarmist is the same as that which provided the opinion on the EU. So renewable and low-carbon energies of all types will be under threat as a result of the likely rightward shift of the government.

For example, the Vote Leave campaign literature railed about wickedness of the Large Combustion Plant Directive, the EU’s coordinated plan for reducing air pollution by forcing older coal-fired power stations to close. The LCPD was actually one of the undoubted successes of the EU energy and environment policy.

The implication is that the Leave people will be happy to see coal back as a major contributor to power supplies even though they also threw about the accusation that the EU had “tied our hands on decarbonisation”. That last complaint is about as far from the truth as is possible to get.

The primary conclusion I take from the events since the referendum is that energy is going to become more expensive in relation to household incomes, at least for a few years, and that the low-carbon transition in the UK will be slowed – partly by the impact of devaluation and loss of funding but also because of the rise in uncertainty over the future direction of energy policy.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change, and a frequent contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was first published on Carbon Commentary. His new book on the global rise of solar PV and energy storage, The Switch, will be published next week by Profile Books.

 

It feels like the tragedy of a generation, but we need to gear up not give up

It’s been a couple of days since the shocking referendum result, and it feels no better than it did on the night.

In fact, if anything, it feels worse. Many of the worst fears of Remain activists seem to be coming true.

Reports of racism and xenophobia are soaring in the aftermath of the biggest victory for British xenophobia since the 1930s. Polish people are being targeted with xenophobic graffiti and having abuse posted through their letterboxes.

People of colour are reporting a rise in racist behaviour. Ethnic minority children are being bullied by their classmates with chants of “out, out, out!” And the far-right are on the march, wearing T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan “Yes we won! Now send them back!”

While Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen celebrate, migrants across the country are terrified for their futures. Even many British people from minority backgrounds feel uneasy. In this context, it is hard to shake the feeling that we have set the already embattled cause of migrant rights back a generation.

The real problem is structural inequality – not migrants

Many of our campaigns at Global Justice Now were fought at the EU level. We now face the depressing prospect of defending these wins against a ‘Brexit government’ led by the far-right of the Conservative party.

And we cannot pretend that this was somehow primarily a ‘vote against austerity’ or the Tories. It is clear that immigration was key to the victory of Leave. To say otherwise is delusion. However, it is also true that poverty and inequality fuelled this result. That is the disease that has utterly divided this country and brought it to the brink of collapse. The tragedy is that the medicine being demanded – blaming migrants – is doomed to make the situation worse not better.

As progressive activists, we must shoulder some of the blame for failing to argue a more positive solution to the real problems people in this country face. We need to right that wrong now. We do this by persuading people that it is the system, not migrants, that are the real cause of our woes.

Let’s argue for a new kind of economy that would actually strengthen some of the communities that have voted for Brexit.

The situation is grim. But we cannot give up to these forces of fear and division. Brexit only won the referendum on the back of utterly shameless lies and deceit. Soon, as it become more apparent that they were conned, moderate Leave voters may start to make their anger felt.

Indeed many of them will be angry that their vote is being used by the far-right to promote xenophobia, while others will be aghast at the lies told about more funding for the NHS.

Standing up for free movement and workers’ rights

Nevertheless, though weak and based on lies, the Leave side have won a mandate to try and secure a Brexit deal. But we do not have to surrender to the prospect of trying to make the best of living in Little England (most likely shorn of Scotland and perhaps Northern Ireland). There are things we can do to fight the worst of the Brexit agenda.

If, as is probably the case, we do end up leaving the EU, we must fight to retain as much as possible of what we have just lost. Top of the list is free movement. A Norway-style relationship to the EU would allow us to keep free movement and some of the safeguards we would otherwise lose.

This is inferior to full membership as it would mean the UK free to negotiate what will probably be ultra-neoliberal trade deals with other countries. It would also mean no democratic influence in Brussels. But there is a genuine case to say that we should work to salvage what we can from the situation. The alternative, that the UK becomes a massive tax haven without freedom of movement, is much worse.

Regardless of what we voted and of which scenario plays out, one thing is clear. We have a serious responsibility to fight the more unsavoury symptoms of Brexit. We have to prioritise defending migrants and making the case for free movement for people from within and outside the EU.

We need to defend with renewed determination the regulations and ‘red tape’ that protects our environment and workers’ rights. And we need to ensure that, in a desperate bid to avert economic meltdown, the UK doesn’t resort to economic imperialism in the Commonwealth countries of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to replace the wealth lost due to the weakening of ties with Europe.

Our movement has never been more important. We have a responsibility not just to campaign but to grow the movement. Get your friends, family, neighbours to join. The reason we lost this fight is because too many of us lived in a bubble for too long. Let’s break out of it and fight so a result like this never happens again. 

 


 

Petition:UK media – stop the hate!‘ by Avaaz.

Alex Scrivener is policy officer at Global Justice Now.

This article was originally published by Global Justice Now.

 

Brexit? It’s not over till it’s over. And here’s why it may never happen

If a week is long time in politics, how long does that make three months? Answer: an archaeological epoch.

That is to say, the period that lies ahead until the Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham in early October opens up giant vistas of time – plenty long enough for everything to change, completely.

And in that time, anything could happen. In fact, one of those anythings already has happened. No, I’m not talking about the Brexit vote itself, but about David Cameron’s response to it.

Before the referendum, he has promised that in the event of a Leave vote, he would instantly trigger the UK’s withdrawal by filing the Article 50 notification that sets off an irrevocable process concluding in the nullification of all EU treaties after no more than two years.

But then, Cameron did no such thing. He left that act to his successor – who would only take office at the Tory Party conference in October. Or possibly, it is now being mooted, in November. After all, surely the candidates should present themselves to the conference, giving members another month in which to ponder, and vote?

And then what’s the rush to file the Article 50 notification even then? None whatsoever, leadership favorite Boris Johnson is indicating. Let the EU stew! We will do it in our own time.

And then what if the new leader calls a general election (or indeed We The People demand one!)? That’s unlikely to take place until, say, March. Or April. Or even May. And we must surely await the outcome of the election before before filing the momentous Article 50 notification?

An extraordinary reversal

So what is really going on here? In my opinion, two things:

1. Over three months, or six months, public opinion is likely to change completely. The narrow but decisive majority in favour of Brexit that emerged in the referendum may have totally evaporated by then. It already appears to be shrinking away as the real economic implications sink in. Cameron knew this might very probably happen and, as a determined Remainer, has left the door firmly open to a reversal of the Brexit decision.

2. For the Leavers, it’s essential to secure the best possible deal from the EU. But the realpolitik says that filing the Article 50 notification is the last, not the first thing, you should do. The UK’s only real negotiating edge comes from its ability to be as awkward as possible while a full, permanent member of the EU. The moment it’s filed, they know we are out after two years no matter what. They (EU officials and other member states) can refuse to concede anything in the ‘formal negotiations’ triggered by Article 50, and after two years we are unceremoniously ejected with no come back.

So what this means, in the realpolitik, is that the negotiations start now – as in fact they already have, with EU officials and grandees, Germany’s Angela Merkel and our Boris all setting out their various positions. Only once these ‘shadow negotiations’ are complete and a deal is tied up can the UK actually file its Article 50 notification – and at that point it’s just over the lawyers to write down what has been agreed, and formal votes to follow in the EU Parliament and Council.

So in fact, it’s likely to be a very long time before any Article 50 Notice is signed – if indeed it ever will be.

But surely the UK has to leave? The People have spoken!

Up to a point, Lord Copper. First, it looks increasingly likely that there will be a general election before any final decision is made. If one (or more) of the parties stand on a ‘Remain’ manifesto pledge and get(s) elected into government, then the referendum result is trumped. And that’s something that could well happen.

But even without that, the government may in the future decide to hold a second referendum (as today urged by Lord Heseltine, backed by almost 4 million citizens) to allow the electorate to vote on the deal that has been negotiated (pre-Article 50, mediated by Angela Merkel), and all the other consequences of a Brexit that have been emerging. These are likely to include:

  • no £350 million a week dividend for the NHS, or for anything else;
  • slower economic recovery in the UK, fewer jobs, reduced pensions, and higher taxes;
  • higher prices for fuel and other imports, and more expensive foreign holidays;
  • a second independence referendum in Scotland, which the SNP would win;
  • a ‘border poll’ in Ireland that could see Northern Ireland quit the UK and the Emerald Isle re-united in brotherly love;
  • being stuck with all that ‘EU red tape’ we love to hate so much as a price of being in the single market – but with no power over it in the EU Council, Parliament or Commission;
  • no reduction in immigration – again, the single market would force us to keep our borders open, with maybe a symbolic exemption for violent criminals;
  • the certain knowledge that if we were to leave and re-join, it would take a long time and we would get a far worse deal than we have now – no rebate, no opt-outs and forcible entry into eurozone and Schengen.

And how many people would vote for that? OK, a few die-hard UKIPpers, but never enough people to win a majority. So there can be little doubt that the now inevitable delays will play into the hands of the Remainers.

Yes, all the talk now is of respecting the verdict of the people and all that. And so it will remain for some time to come. But with the strong shift in public sentiment that is already under way, and set to grow, it won’t last out a run of strong Remain opinion polls.

A best-case scenario?

Of course this may not end well for the UK, Europe and the environment. But it could. If Jeremy Corbyn survives the leadership putsch now under way from the Blairite rump of MPs in the Parliamentary Labour Party, he would be in a position to fight a putative general election on a powerful, progressive pro-EU platform.

This would be based on his vision of a social EU – an EU of the people, not the corporations; and a pro-environment EU, taking a lead on global warming, accelerating the transition to renewable energy economy, ramping up enforcement of environment laws, moving ahead with the creation of a ‘circular economy’, and clamping down on toxic agrochemicals.

And of course ditching TTIP, CETA, TISA and all the rotten medley of ‘free trade’ deals that hand over vast antidemocratic powers to global corporations and financiers.

That’s an election he could win, and go on to build the fairer, cleaner, greener, more inclusive Britain we so desperately need.

 


 

Oliver Tickell is Contributing Editor at The Ecologist.

 

Where will our next PM stand on fracking and the environment? (It’s not looking good)

Britain has voted to leave the EU. David Cameron has resigned as Prime Minister. And the markets are in turmoil.

There will now be an almighty battle to become the next Conservative Party leader and with it, until the next election at least, the next Prime Minister.

So let’s take a look at the candidates for the top job and find out what they might do to the environment.

Let’s start with the favourite, Boris Johnson.

Johnson is something of a climate sceptic and used his Telegraph column a few years back to cast doubts on the existence of global warming by pointing out that it was snowing in London.

The former London Mayor voted to allow fracking in national parks and areas of special scientific interest in December last year. In fact, he loves fracking so much, he said in 2013 that wanted it under the streets of the Capital.

“If reserves of shale can be exploited in London we should leave no stone unturned, or unfracked, in the cause of keeping the lights on. It’s time for maximum boldness in energy supply”, he said.

That’s right, ‘maximum boldness’, none of this namby-pamby ‘boldness light’, endorsed by the empty suits in Brussels.

The likely leader of post-Brexit Britain is also handsomely backed by Ukrainian millionaire and energy magnate Alexander Termerko who has tipped his man as the next Tory leader.

The man standing awkwardly behind Boris for much of the referendum campaign, struggling to clap like a human being, also voted to allow fracking in national parks in that December vote.

Michael Gove caused controversy while education secretary for threatening to remove climate change from the national geography curriculum. He’s also backed badger culling and the sell-off of English forests.

Given that he’s spent the last few months cheering him, you would think he’d be unlikely to challenge Boris for the leadership. But with strong support with the Tory base, he could be persuaded to throw his hat into the ring.

The rest of the leading figures in the Conservative side of pro-Brexit camp have a similarly un-green look to them.

Employment minister Priti Patel is seen as a rising star on the right of the Conservative Party. In a past life, she did PR for the tobacco industry. Now she’s one of the key figures within the parliamentary party’s right-wing 1922 committee.

On top of backing fracking in national parks, Patel has called on the government to hold firm against ‘anti-fracking extremists’. She also joined her group of Eurosceptics in voting to apply the climate change levy tax to electricity generated from renewable sources in March. October may well come too soon for Patel, but she’ll be a key figure in a Johnson’s government, whether she seeks the leadership or nor.

Other key Brexiteers who are unlikely challenge the leadership, but will play important parts include Chris Grayling, who has claimed that fracking was the “solution” to high energy bills, Iain Duncan Smith, was also fine with our national parks being fracked, and has “consistently voted against measures to prevent climate change”, according to They Work For You and Andrea Leadsom.

Leadsom asked if climate change was real when she started her job as an energy minister, but now insists she has been ‘fully persuaded’. She has dismissed ‘fracking scaremongering’ and has called the process an opportunity not to be missed.

Perhaps the least green of the Brexiteers, however, is former environment secretary Owen Paterson, and at this point he looks likely to run against Johnson for leadership.

A noted climate sceptic, Paterson has advocated scrapping the climate change act. He is also a supporter of the controversial Global Warming Policy Foundation and has spoken at events held by the organisation.

In a speech earlier this month, Paterson claimed that leaving the EU would be good for the environment, though as he has previously spoken about the “advantages of global warming”, it’s best to take that with a pinch of salt.

Theresa May is likely to be Johnson biggest challenger, but her standing with party activists has been damaged by her support for the Remain campaign in the referendum. She has a mixed record on the environment, and was absent for the vote on fracking in national parks before Christmas. A loyal cabinet member, May’s voting record mirrors the government’s record on energy and climate change.

These are unsettled times, but one thing is certain: if you thought the in-fighting in the Conservative Party was bad during the referendum, you won’t believe what’s about to come.

 


 

Joe Sandler Clarke is an Investigator at Greenpeace UK. He also writes for Greenpeace Energydesk, where this article was originally published.

 

Higher fuel bills, less renewables, an end to nuclear power: Brexit’s energy shakeout

The large devaluation of the last few days will have significant effects on UK energy, from electricity to motor fuels. Other changes are also likely to slow decarbonisation of the economy.

Hinkley Point C is even less likely to be built.  As at the point of writing, the pound is down about 16% against both the dollar and the Euro compared to twelve months ago. That means that all the components for the power station purchased outside the UK will be 16% more expensive.

EdF has indicated in the past that “up to 57%” of the cost of Hinkley will be spent on UK goods and services. Let’s be a little sceptical and say that only half the cost of the new nuclear plant will be incurred in the UK.

The last estimate we saw was that constructing Hinkley was going to absorb £18bn. If half of that cost is derived from imported components and other charges the exchange rate decline over the last year has added over £1.4bn to the bill. Much of that has been in the last few days.

The electricity that Hinkley generates will be no more valuable to EdF than before. The strike price of £92.50 a megawatt hour does not rise in the event of a UK devaluation. So the prospective financial return to EdF and the Chinese shareholders has fallen sharply.

Perhaps as importantly, the position may get worse if the decline in the value of the pound continues but nobody can know this in advance, nor can it be fully hedged against.

Now all the UK’s nuclear projects will be more expensive

The same argument applies to all other prospective nuclear construction in the UK. Put at its simplest, the components for nuclear power stations will largely be shipped into the UK and then assembled here. The rapid devaluation that is going on has made all future projects more expensive. Nuclear fuel (costing about $5 for a megawatt hour’s worth of uranium) will also become more costly.

There is a counter-argument. If Brexit pushes interest rates in the UK even lower – and the signs are that this is happening – EdF may be prepared to take a lower return on its capital than would previously have been the case.

Rumours have suggested that EdF’s financial projections were based on a 9% cost of capital. We could argue that this number is too high; UK utilities generally run on a 6% estimate. However there is no sign yet that either EdF, the French government, or Hinkley’s Chinese backers are prepared to accept a lower return.

Lastly, as at Monday midday, EdF’s shares have fallen 20% since the Thursday referendum. EdF’s total stock market value is now less than the cost of Hinkley, a position seen earlier in the year but from which the company had been climbing out of. Investors see profoundly bad effects on EdF from Brexit.

Gas bills likely to rise around 10%

Gas fired power stations are relatively cheap to build and operate. (Perhaps £600-£700m for a gigawatt of capacity, or about a tenth the price of new nuclear). Fuel is the most important part of the costs they face. The price of gas is set in an increasingly international market.

Although contracts in the gas market are set in sterling, the underlying global price set in US dollars feeds into the UK’s auctions. Devaluation will therefore add sharply to the cost of buying gas for power generation. This will force up the long-run price of electricity because developers of new power stations will need guarantees of higher prices before they build their plants.

My rough calculation is that the wholesale price of electricity will need to be about 10% higher as a result of the events of the last few days. The price that homes pay for gas will be equally adversely affected.

If these increases do directly feed through to household bills, the immediate impact will be about £100 per home. People will also see inflation in the costs of goods and services they buy because their suppliers will also face higher costs of energy.

Those of us over fifty will remember this phenomenon clearly: large devaluations push up prices. The referendum decision will significantly affect the least prosperous because more of their income is spent on heat and electricity than wealthier groups. Fuel poverty will probably rise, possibly sharply. This will tend to affect worst those most likely to have voted to leave.

Petrol prices will start creeping up

The oil price has been gradually recovering after the sub $30 lows seen earlier in the year. Today, the cost of a barrel is bobbing around $50. But a dollar is now 15% more costly to those buying in British pounds than it was a year ago.

The price of petrol will therefore also rise although the percentage impact is softened by the fact that more than half the cost of a litre of fuel is composed of duty, VAT and UK denominated costs. Nevertheless, we’ll see a visible jump in fuel prices in the next few weeks.

The cost position of the UK North Sea will be improved, making it slightly easier for offshore oil and gas rigs to stay in business.

Will the rise in the price of oil help the sales of electric cars? It depends. In my view, the rise in renewables will in the longer run force down electricity prices all around the world. The economics of buying and operating an electric car will tend to get better as time goes as by, Brexit or not. Short term relative prices changes in petrol and electricity costs have little impact.

Renewables – priced in Euros, offshore wind will get more costly

The impact on renewables is slightly more nuanced. In the case of solar, withdrawal from the EU would mean that the UK could escape from the ‘Minimum Import Price’ facing Chinese companies. The price of solar modules would fall in Euro terms.

But because the Euro is now more valuable than it was a week ago, the impact in pounds would be much less. Perhaps the price of Chinese panels will be higher than it would have been without the devaluation and prospective exit from the EU.

Other system components, such as inverters, will also rise in price. Because over 80% of the cost of a large solar field is imported (my guess – better estimates welcome), PV will become much more costly, at least temporarily.

In the case of wind, more of the manufacturing value is added in the UK than in the case of solar. Perhaps they now regret it, but some of the large offshore turbine makers have factories and installation operations here. The UK should become an even more important centre for wind turbine construction as a result of devaluation.

However this optimism is only justified if we believe that the UK will be able to export to major markets without substantial tariff impediment. As of today, this is no certainty.

A large fraction of the total costs of offshore wind farms are denominated in Euros. The fall in the value of the pound will make developing large wind areas, such as those on Dogger Bank, more expensive. This will reduce the pace of offshore wind development, perhaps substantially.

Energy R&D

Places like Culham and Harwell, the UK’s energy research centres in Oxfordshire, will diminish sharply in size and importance. The nuclear fusion lab at Culham gets £55m a year from the EU, a large fraction of its budget.

As importantly, research into the conversion of surplus electricity into gas and liquid fuels that can be stored for months will be slowed. As PV and batteries becomes ever cheaper globally, this is the last remaining challenge for the clear energy revolution and the UK had been in a commanding position because of its world-leading role in biochemistry.

The Brexit vote is a huge setback for research in this area.

A right-wing government hostile to renewables?

More generally, of course, any new Conservative government will be profoundly sceptical about climate change. The part of the human brain that determines whether one is a denialist or a climate alarmist is the same as that which provided the opinion on the EU. So renewable and low-carbon energies of all types will be under threat as a result of the likely rightward shift of the government.

For example, the Vote Leave campaign literature railed about wickedness of the Large Combustion Plant Directive, the EU’s coordinated plan for reducing air pollution by forcing older coal-fired power stations to close. The LCPD was actually one of the undoubted successes of the EU energy and environment policy.

The implication is that the Leave people will be happy to see coal back as a major contributor to power supplies even though they also threw about the accusation that the EU had “tied our hands on decarbonisation”. That last complaint is about as far from the truth as is possible to get.

The primary conclusion I take from the events since the referendum is that energy is going to become more expensive in relation to household incomes, at least for a few years, and that the low-carbon transition in the UK will be slowed – partly by the impact of devaluation and loss of funding but also because of the rise in uncertainty over the future direction of energy policy.

 


 

Chris Goodall is an expert on energy, environment and climate change, and a frequent contributor to The Ecologist. He blogs at Carbon Commentary.

This article was first published on Carbon Commentary. His new book on the global rise of solar PV and energy storage, The Switch, will be published next week by Profile Books.