Monthly Archives: January 2017

Four essential ‘green lines’ for Brexit negotiators

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Brexit risks harming the UK’s environment unless the government passes stiff new legislation before it triggers Article 50.

That’s the conclusion of a major new report by the Environment Audit Committee, a cross-bench group of 16 MPs.

In the run-up to the referendum, most experts were very worried about the environmental impact of Brexit and, since the vote, some of these concerns have been confirmed.

Think, for example, of Michael Gove and John Whittingdale inviting companies to draw a wish list for a bonfire of EU social and environmental legislation.

On the other hand, some environmental NGOs have launched a campaign to achieve a “Greener UK” after the vote, seizing Brexit as an opportunity to increase, not decrease, environmental ambition.

So, which way is Britain going to go? This depends on whether Theresa May’s government uses the Brexit negotiation to actually deliver on its manifesto commitment to “be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than it found it”.

As with anything Brexit-related, a ‘green Brexit’ is full of uncertainties, and faces both technical and political difficulties. However the audit committee’s report can help us draw ‘green lines’ on which to judge how eco-friendly Brexit is really likely to be.

1. Adopt clear policy objectives

Long before the referendum the government started working on two parallel 25-year plans for the environment and agriculture / food. But progress has been slow, and consultation on this flagship policy has still not started. As with Brexit more generally, clear environmental goals have been promised but not yet delivered.

Environment secretary Andrea Leadsom’s speech yesterday to the Oxford Farming conference was a classic example of trying to have it both ways. “By cutting the red tape that comes out of Brussels”, she said, “we will free our farmers to grow more, sell more and export more great British food whilst upholding our high standards for plant and animal health and welfare.”

But is it really possible to ‘cut red tape’ and maintain high standards? When the two objectives collide, which will win out? The absence of clarity on what the government is trying to achieve for farming and the environment makes it difficult to ensure these unknown objectives are not inadvertently thwarted during the Brexit negotiations.

A first Brexit green line, then, is that negotiating objectives should be, as much as possible, aligned with the 25-year plans. The MPs’ report suggests the basic framework and consultation on both plans should take place before the government officially starts negotiating to leave the EU.

This would ensure any conflicts between the two plans and the Brexit negotiation brief are considered and hopefully mitigated.

2. Beware of regulatory gaps

The prime minister has called for a “Great Repeal Bill“ to transfer to UK law all applicable EU law and ensure a smooth transition.

But copy-pasting legislation is not so straightforward: Andrea Leadsom, told the environmental committee that, of the 800 or more pieces of European environmental legislation, up to a third would not be automatically carried over.

What is striking in the committee’s report is how little is known about what these gaps actually are, and which policy areas are particularly at risk.

A second green line for Brexit would be to identify these gaps as soon as possible and make sure they are effectively plugged by the time the UK leaves the EU. To do this, the committee suggests that “any provisions which cannot be transposed into UK law should form the basis of a new Environmental Protection Act.”

3. Coordinate across the UK

May’s government is working on a Brexit deal for the “whole UK“, but environmental policy is a devolved area. While there are of course EU-wide rules, they’re implemented slightly differently in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Common rules limit regulatory divergence, although it still exists: for example, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland have banned their farmers from growing genetically modified crops but England has not.

The Great Repeal Bill therefore risks fuelling constitutional tensions within the UK. Establishing UK-wide rules, such as minimum pollution standards, would see Westminster taking back control from the devolved administrations, and not just from Europe. It would be politically difficult – indeed the Scottish government is clearly opposed to it – but may be, to some extent, environmentally necessary.

A third green line for Brexit would thus be to achieve both minimum standards throughout the UK and to respect devolved administration’s competences to adopt more ambitious and innovative policies.

4. Don’t stick environmental policy in a silo

Coordination will not only be needed between devolved and central administration, but within central administration itself.

How the UK answers the two central Brexit questions – in or out of the single market? In or out of the customs union? – will have major impacts on the environment. Notably, if the UK opts for a hard Brexit (out of both single market and customs union) and is to negotiate its own trade deals, environmental standards could be at risk. Just think of the Europe-wide mobilisation against the EU-US trade deal TTIP on this very basis.

A fourth green line for Brexit is that the UK environment should not lose out from these new deals. The committee asks that “the government should guarantee that it will not trade away environmental protections, animal welfare and food safety standards, as part of the negotiations to leave, or as part of future trade deals.”

These four green lines will allow us to gauge the Brexit negotiation from an environmental perspective. A first test will be in how the government responds to the Environment Audit Committee’s report.

But the key test will be the UK’s official negotiation position – and whether it makes any mention of the environment.

 

 

Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics, Queen’s University BelfastThe Conversation.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 

Four essential ‘green lines’ for Brexit negotiators

Leave a reply

Brexit risks harming the UK’s environment unless the government passes stiff new legislation before it triggers Article 50.

That’s the conclusion of a major new report by the Environment Audit Committee, a cross-bench group of 16 MPs.

In the run-up to the referendum, most experts were very worried about the environmental impact of Brexit and, since the vote, some of these concerns have been confirmed.

Think, for example, of Michael Gove and John Whittingdale inviting companies to draw a wish list for a bonfire of EU social and environmental legislation.

On the other hand, some environmental NGOs have launched a campaign to achieve a “Greener UK” after the vote, seizing Brexit as an opportunity to increase, not decrease, environmental ambition.

So, which way is Britain going to go? This depends on whether Theresa May’s government uses the Brexit negotiation to actually deliver on its manifesto commitment to “be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than it found it”.

As with anything Brexit-related, a ‘green Brexit’ is full of uncertainties, and faces both technical and political difficulties. However the audit committee’s report can help us draw ‘green lines’ on which to judge how eco-friendly Brexit is really likely to be.

1. Adopt clear policy objectives

Long before the referendum the government started working on two parallel 25-year plans for the environment and agriculture / food. But progress has been slow, and consultation on this flagship policy has still not started. As with Brexit more generally, clear environmental goals have been promised but not yet delivered.

Environment secretary Andrea Leadsom’s speech yesterday to the Oxford Farming conference was a classic example of trying to have it both ways. “By cutting the red tape that comes out of Brussels”, she said, “we will free our farmers to grow more, sell more and export more great British food whilst upholding our high standards for plant and animal health and welfare.”

But is it really possible to ‘cut red tape’ and maintain high standards? When the two objectives collide, which will win out? The absence of clarity on what the government is trying to achieve for farming and the environment makes it difficult to ensure these unknown objectives are not inadvertently thwarted during the Brexit negotiations.

A first Brexit green line, then, is that negotiating objectives should be, as much as possible, aligned with the 25-year plans. The MPs’ report suggests the basic framework and consultation on both plans should take place before the government officially starts negotiating to leave the EU.

This would ensure any conflicts between the two plans and the Brexit negotiation brief are considered and hopefully mitigated.

2. Beware of regulatory gaps

The prime minister has called for a “Great Repeal Bill“ to transfer to UK law all applicable EU law and ensure a smooth transition.

But copy-pasting legislation is not so straightforward: Andrea Leadsom, told the environmental committee that, of the 800 or more pieces of European environmental legislation, up to a third would not be automatically carried over.

What is striking in the committee’s report is how little is known about what these gaps actually are, and which policy areas are particularly at risk.

A second green line for Brexit would be to identify these gaps as soon as possible and make sure they are effectively plugged by the time the UK leaves the EU. To do this, the committee suggests that “any provisions which cannot be transposed into UK law should form the basis of a new Environmental Protection Act.”

3. Coordinate across the UK

May’s government is working on a Brexit deal for the “whole UK“, but environmental policy is a devolved area. While there are of course EU-wide rules, they’re implemented slightly differently in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Common rules limit regulatory divergence, although it still exists: for example, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland have banned their farmers from growing genetically modified crops but England has not.

The Great Repeal Bill therefore risks fuelling constitutional tensions within the UK. Establishing UK-wide rules, such as minimum pollution standards, would see Westminster taking back control from the devolved administrations, and not just from Europe. It would be politically difficult – indeed the Scottish government is clearly opposed to it – but may be, to some extent, environmentally necessary.

A third green line for Brexit would thus be to achieve both minimum standards throughout the UK and to respect devolved administration’s competences to adopt more ambitious and innovative policies.

4. Don’t stick environmental policy in a silo

Coordination will not only be needed between devolved and central administration, but within central administration itself.

How the UK answers the two central Brexit questions – in or out of the single market? In or out of the customs union? – will have major impacts on the environment. Notably, if the UK opts for a hard Brexit (out of both single market and customs union) and is to negotiate its own trade deals, environmental standards could be at risk. Just think of the Europe-wide mobilisation against the EU-US trade deal TTIP on this very basis.

A fourth green line for Brexit is that the UK environment should not lose out from these new deals. The committee asks that “the government should guarantee that it will not trade away environmental protections, animal welfare and food safety standards, as part of the negotiations to leave, or as part of future trade deals.”

These four green lines will allow us to gauge the Brexit negotiation from an environmental perspective. A first test will be in how the government responds to the Environment Audit Committee’s report.

But the key test will be the UK’s official negotiation position – and whether it makes any mention of the environment.

 

 

Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics, Queen’s University BelfastThe Conversation.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 

Four essential ‘green lines’ for Brexit negotiators

Leave a reply

Brexit risks harming the UK’s environment unless the government passes stiff new legislation before it triggers Article 50.

That’s the conclusion of a major new report by the Environment Audit Committee, a cross-bench group of 16 MPs.

In the run-up to the referendum, most experts were very worried about the environmental impact of Brexit and, since the vote, some of these concerns have been confirmed.

Think, for example, of Michael Gove and John Whittingdale inviting companies to draw a wish list for a bonfire of EU social and environmental legislation.

On the other hand, some environmental NGOs have launched a campaign to achieve a “Greener UK” after the vote, seizing Brexit as an opportunity to increase, not decrease, environmental ambition.

So, which way is Britain going to go? This depends on whether Theresa May’s government uses the Brexit negotiation to actually deliver on its manifesto commitment to “be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than it found it”.

As with anything Brexit-related, a ‘green Brexit’ is full of uncertainties, and faces both technical and political difficulties. However the audit committee’s report can help us draw ‘green lines’ on which to judge how eco-friendly Brexit is really likely to be.

1. Adopt clear policy objectives

Long before the referendum the government started working on two parallel 25-year plans for the environment and agriculture / food. But progress has been slow, and consultation on this flagship policy has still not started. As with Brexit more generally, clear environmental goals have been promised but not yet delivered.

Environment secretary Andrea Leadsom’s speech yesterday to the Oxford Farming conference was a classic example of trying to have it both ways. “By cutting the red tape that comes out of Brussels”, she said, “we will free our farmers to grow more, sell more and export more great British food whilst upholding our high standards for plant and animal health and welfare.”

But is it really possible to ‘cut red tape’ and maintain high standards? When the two objectives collide, which will win out? The absence of clarity on what the government is trying to achieve for farming and the environment makes it difficult to ensure these unknown objectives are not inadvertently thwarted during the Brexit negotiations.

A first Brexit green line, then, is that negotiating objectives should be, as much as possible, aligned with the 25-year plans. The MPs’ report suggests the basic framework and consultation on both plans should take place before the government officially starts negotiating to leave the EU.

This would ensure any conflicts between the two plans and the Brexit negotiation brief are considered and hopefully mitigated.

2. Beware of regulatory gaps

The prime minister has called for a “Great Repeal Bill“ to transfer to UK law all applicable EU law and ensure a smooth transition.

But copy-pasting legislation is not so straightforward: Andrea Leadsom, told the environmental committee that, of the 800 or more pieces of European environmental legislation, up to a third would not be automatically carried over.

What is striking in the committee’s report is how little is known about what these gaps actually are, and which policy areas are particularly at risk.

A second green line for Brexit would be to identify these gaps as soon as possible and make sure they are effectively plugged by the time the UK leaves the EU. To do this, the committee suggests that “any provisions which cannot be transposed into UK law should form the basis of a new Environmental Protection Act.”

3. Coordinate across the UK

May’s government is working on a Brexit deal for the “whole UK“, but environmental policy is a devolved area. While there are of course EU-wide rules, they’re implemented slightly differently in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Common rules limit regulatory divergence, although it still exists: for example, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland have banned their farmers from growing genetically modified crops but England has not.

The Great Repeal Bill therefore risks fuelling constitutional tensions within the UK. Establishing UK-wide rules, such as minimum pollution standards, would see Westminster taking back control from the devolved administrations, and not just from Europe. It would be politically difficult – indeed the Scottish government is clearly opposed to it – but may be, to some extent, environmentally necessary.

A third green line for Brexit would thus be to achieve both minimum standards throughout the UK and to respect devolved administration’s competences to adopt more ambitious and innovative policies.

4. Don’t stick environmental policy in a silo

Coordination will not only be needed between devolved and central administration, but within central administration itself.

How the UK answers the two central Brexit questions – in or out of the single market? In or out of the customs union? – will have major impacts on the environment. Notably, if the UK opts for a hard Brexit (out of both single market and customs union) and is to negotiate its own trade deals, environmental standards could be at risk. Just think of the Europe-wide mobilisation against the EU-US trade deal TTIP on this very basis.

A fourth green line for Brexit is that the UK environment should not lose out from these new deals. The committee asks that “the government should guarantee that it will not trade away environmental protections, animal welfare and food safety standards, as part of the negotiations to leave, or as part of future trade deals.”

These four green lines will allow us to gauge the Brexit negotiation from an environmental perspective. A first test will be in how the government responds to the Environment Audit Committee’s report.

But the key test will be the UK’s official negotiation position – and whether it makes any mention of the environment.

 

 

Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics, Queen’s University BelfastThe Conversation.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 

Four essential ‘green lines’ for Brexit negotiators

Leave a reply

Brexit risks harming the UK’s environment unless the government passes stiff new legislation before it triggers Article 50.

That’s the conclusion of a major new report by the Environment Audit Committee, a cross-bench group of 16 MPs.

In the run-up to the referendum, most experts were very worried about the environmental impact of Brexit and, since the vote, some of these concerns have been confirmed.

Think, for example, of Michael Gove and John Whittingdale inviting companies to draw a wish list for a bonfire of EU social and environmental legislation.

On the other hand, some environmental NGOs have launched a campaign to achieve a “Greener UK” after the vote, seizing Brexit as an opportunity to increase, not decrease, environmental ambition.

So, which way is Britain going to go? This depends on whether Theresa May’s government uses the Brexit negotiation to actually deliver on its manifesto commitment to “be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than it found it”.

As with anything Brexit-related, a ‘green Brexit’ is full of uncertainties, and faces both technical and political difficulties. However the audit committee’s report can help us draw ‘green lines’ on which to judge how eco-friendly Brexit is really likely to be.

1. Adopt clear policy objectives

Long before the referendum the government started working on two parallel 25-year plans for the environment and agriculture / food. But progress has been slow, and consultation on this flagship policy has still not started. As with Brexit more generally, clear environmental goals have been promised but not yet delivered.

Environment secretary Andrea Leadsom’s speech yesterday to the Oxford Farming conference was a classic example of trying to have it both ways. “By cutting the red tape that comes out of Brussels”, she said, “we will free our farmers to grow more, sell more and export more great British food whilst upholding our high standards for plant and animal health and welfare.”

But is it really possible to ‘cut red tape’ and maintain high standards? When the two objectives collide, which will win out? The absence of clarity on what the government is trying to achieve for farming and the environment makes it difficult to ensure these unknown objectives are not inadvertently thwarted during the Brexit negotiations.

A first Brexit green line, then, is that negotiating objectives should be, as much as possible, aligned with the 25-year plans. The MPs’ report suggests the basic framework and consultation on both plans should take place before the government officially starts negotiating to leave the EU.

This would ensure any conflicts between the two plans and the Brexit negotiation brief are considered and hopefully mitigated.

2. Beware of regulatory gaps

The prime minister has called for a “Great Repeal Bill“ to transfer to UK law all applicable EU law and ensure a smooth transition.

But copy-pasting legislation is not so straightforward: Andrea Leadsom, told the environmental committee that, of the 800 or more pieces of European environmental legislation, up to a third would not be automatically carried over.

What is striking in the committee’s report is how little is known about what these gaps actually are, and which policy areas are particularly at risk.

A second green line for Brexit would be to identify these gaps as soon as possible and make sure they are effectively plugged by the time the UK leaves the EU. To do this, the committee suggests that “any provisions which cannot be transposed into UK law should form the basis of a new Environmental Protection Act.”

3. Coordinate across the UK

May’s government is working on a Brexit deal for the “whole UK“, but environmental policy is a devolved area. While there are of course EU-wide rules, they’re implemented slightly differently in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Common rules limit regulatory divergence, although it still exists: for example, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland have banned their farmers from growing genetically modified crops but England has not.

The Great Repeal Bill therefore risks fuelling constitutional tensions within the UK. Establishing UK-wide rules, such as minimum pollution standards, would see Westminster taking back control from the devolved administrations, and not just from Europe. It would be politically difficult – indeed the Scottish government is clearly opposed to it – but may be, to some extent, environmentally necessary.

A third green line for Brexit would thus be to achieve both minimum standards throughout the UK and to respect devolved administration’s competences to adopt more ambitious and innovative policies.

4. Don’t stick environmental policy in a silo

Coordination will not only be needed between devolved and central administration, but within central administration itself.

How the UK answers the two central Brexit questions – in or out of the single market? In or out of the customs union? – will have major impacts on the environment. Notably, if the UK opts for a hard Brexit (out of both single market and customs union) and is to negotiate its own trade deals, environmental standards could be at risk. Just think of the Europe-wide mobilisation against the EU-US trade deal TTIP on this very basis.

A fourth green line for Brexit is that the UK environment should not lose out from these new deals. The committee asks that “the government should guarantee that it will not trade away environmental protections, animal welfare and food safety standards, as part of the negotiations to leave, or as part of future trade deals.”

These four green lines will allow us to gauge the Brexit negotiation from an environmental perspective. A first test will be in how the government responds to the Environment Audit Committee’s report.

But the key test will be the UK’s official negotiation position – and whether it makes any mention of the environment.

 

 

Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics, Queen’s University BelfastThe Conversation.

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

 

Long-promised nuclear revival has run out of steam

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There have been three well-documented major nuclear accidents in the last 60 years, each one accompanied by official lies and cover-ups.

 There have been other less well-known serious accidents that have been so effectively hushed up that decades later there are only the sketchiest details available.

The legacy of these disasters is a deep distrust of the industry by many voters. In some leading industrial countries this has led to governments being forced to abandon nuclear power altogether, while others face such strong opposition to new stations being built that they have abandoned the idea, although they still keep the old ones operating, at least for now.

This chequered history of the industry matters. It has caused a global split. While many scientists and politicians concerned about climate change believe that nuclear power is vital if governments are to meet their commitments to curb dangerous global warming, just as many do not. 

The opposition is based on the belief that the industry has lost all integrity and credibility and that renewables are a cheaper, safer and all-round better bet.  This view is reinforced by the inability of the industry to deal with its waste. Renewables can easily be recycled, but nuclear waste remains dangerous for thousands of years, leaving future generations to pay for it.

But it is the three major disasters that are at the root of this fierce debate. They happened over a span of 60 years, and all had different causes. But all followed a familiar pattern.

From Windscale to Fukushima

The first was at Windscale in north-west England in 1957, when a plutonium-producing reactor caught fire. The second was Chernobyl on the border of Ukraine and Belarus in 1986: the top blew off one of the reactors and there was a serious fire. The third was at Fukushima in Japan in 2011, when an earthquake and a tsunami caused meltdowns at three reactors.

All three accidents had startling similarities in the official reaction. In each case the governments involved, the nuclear regulators and plant owners tried to hide the scale of the disaster from the public who were most in danger. In each case this resulted in unnecessary exposure of the population to harmful radiation.

Second, the possible long-term health effects to the people involved were hotly disputed. In each case this took the form, both at the time and ever since, of governments and the industry playing down the health risks.

There is still an argument about whether the Windscale fire caused a leukaemia cluster in children in the neighbourhood. After Fukushima, governments and the industry claim, very few or no deaths at all resulted. Expect the argument to continue for decades.

Third has been the underplaying of the enormous cost and intractable nature of trying to clean up the mess. For example, people who are evacuated are told the move is only temporary, when it could last for decades, possibly generations.

Again, the official estimate for’ compensation’ for the Fukushima accident rose from ¥5.4 trillion (£40bn) to ¥8 trillion (£70bn), a fact only slipped out at the end of November 2016, nearly five years after the accident.

Technically insurmountable

In each case, even after the Windscale accident 60 years ago, the clean-up of the actual nuclear pile that caught fire has several times started and then been abandoned as too difficult. They are not expected to be completed for decades.

There is no hope of cleaning up Chernobyl or Fukushima this century. A new concrete shell over Chernobyl to replace the existing crumbling structure should be in place by 2017 at a cost of €2.1 billion – but this is designed only as a temporary structure, to last 100 years.

Governments tried hard to cover up what happened. At Windscale,  the British government subsequently admitted it had deliberately covered up the seriousness of the accidents to keep its nuclear weapons programme on track.

In Chernobyl’s case it was the sky-high radiation readings from as far away as Scandinavia and Germany that led the Soviets to admit what had happened. Thirty years later the real health effects of the accident are hotly disputed.

Thousands of children have had their thyroids removed and there have been many birth defects and cancers. Belarus, worst hit by the disaster, is anxious to play down the long-term effects to avoid frightening potential foreign investors in the country.

The nuclear industry has been trying hard to put all this in the past. In response to public concerns it has come up with a whole series of ‘safer’ designs for nuclear power stations. As a result, some countries like Finland and Britain are encouraging the building of a new generation of French, Japanese, Chinese and American designs.

Nuclear power can only survive on taxpayer handouts

This time, however, it is not just safety that is at issue. For the last 35 years not a single nuclear power station in the west has been built to time or on budget. It undermines the claim that nuclear power will be able to compete with other fuels on price. It has repeatedly been shown that, without government subsidy, nuclear power cannot survive.

The latest evidence for this is the two new power stations being built in Finland and France, at Olkiluoto and Flamanville. Both are nearly 10 years behind schedule and have more than doubled in cost.

The original claims that the price of the electricity the stations would produce would be competitive cannot be true. Wholesale prices must already have more than doubled before a single watt of power has been produced.

Financial markets have also just witnessed the astonishing financial meltdown that has hot Toshiba, which has seen its market capitalisation fall by over $6 billion as a result of massive losses and growing liabilities in its CB&I Stone & Webster and Westinghouse nuclear construction subsidiaries. From 14th December to today, Toshiba’s share price has fallen from ¥468 to ¥277 as news of problems with its flagship AP1000 nuclear reactor, and huge time and cost over-runs at construction sites in the US and China, has emerged.

Yet, despite this track record, the nuclear industry hopes to keep on growing and claims it is expecting to do so – and many governments continue to pour money into research and development. They do so in the hope that one day nuclear power will provide a safe and economically viable method of producing electricity.

So far, however, there is no sign of the long-predicted nuclear renaissance. The costs of a safe design continue to increase as the industry and governments attempt to live down the legacy of misleading the public for the last 60 years.

It seems that if the climate is to be saved from overheating, we shall have to do this without the aid of new nuclear power.

 

 

Paul Brown writes for Climate News Network, where this article was originally published. Some additional reporting by The Ecologist.

 

"Small really is beautiful", claims new report on England’s farming

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“Small-scale food production is more sustainable, provides work for more people, produces food which is consumed locally, has shorter supply chains, and provides greater returns to the farmers,” argues author Miles King.

Post-Brexit, he believes: “An England farm support system could inject much more support into small-scale food production.”

The Land Workers’ Alliance (LWA) agrees. One of eight points raised in its proposed framework for British Agricultural Policy post-Brexit sounds the call: “End the discrimination against small farms”.

The report states: “It is unjustifiable for Defra to continue to discriminate against small farms in the allocation of subsidies and collection of farm data.”

Instead, Miles King proposes a shift to supporting “small-scale sustainable farming which benefits nature”, including paying landowners for the delivery of public goods to society. Public goods “are defined as things which benefit society but do not create a private profit”.

Some public goods are: features making up the fabric of the landscape (like hedges, ponds and streams); the provision of clean water, flood prevention; healthy pollinator populations; carbon storage and sequestration; as well as “the many valuable yet intangible things nature provides to people – inspiration, joy, reflection, solace, emotional and spiritual experiences.”

“These features need protection and management, but it is right that landowners should be paid to carry out that protection and management on behalf of society,” says King.

The EU’s Joint Research Centre estimates that food accounts for around a third of the average European’s impact on climate change, so policy changes will need to be coupled with awareness campaigns on the benefits of buying local, such as saving long cross-country journeys from farm to plate.

Support for this view is found in a 2013 report from the UN trade and environment review. More than 60 international experts came together to contribute to the Wake Up Before It Is Too Late report, which states that an holistic approach to agricultural management is needed, recognising that “a farmer is not only a producer of agricultural goods, but also a manager of an agro-ecological system that provides quite a number of public goods and services.”

Within this approach, there should also be a significant shift from industrial production characterised by monocultures towards “mosaics of sustainable, regenerative production systems that also considerably improve the productivity of small-scale farmers.”

Fruits and vegetables would be a useful place to start, suggests Miles King. Defra statistics show that 24 countries accounted for 90% of the fruit and vegetable supply of the UK (UK supplied 23%), but King argues that, “Many types of fruit and vegetable can now be grown in England both outside and under cover, on highly productive but small plots”.

Worth noting though, is a point made by the EU GLAMUR global and local food chain assessment project which suggests that new policies will need to recognise the “hybridity and interconnectedness of global and local food systems”.

The UK’s food culture has been Europeanised since joining the Common Market in 1973, a study by City University (London) states. And nothing makes more apparent than the fact that pizza is now UK childrens’ favourite food. Membership of the EU has eased the flow of food, yet at the same time local industries have been rebuilt (there are now approximately 100 more UK artisanal cheeses than in France according to the British Cheese Awards).

The study concludes, “Will the British have the confidence to move forward and accept this remarkable post-war culinary learning?”

Now, post-Brexit, this question is more pertinent than ever. Can new policies balance the need for a shift towards small-scale production (for example of pears and apples that don’t need to be imported, but often are), while still satisfying consumer tastes?

 This article is part of a new content-sharing arrangement with the LUSH – the ethical cosmetics company that also works to support sustainable farming practices across the Globe

 

 

 

"Small really is beautiful", claims new report on England’s farming

Leave a reply

“Small-scale food production is more sustainable, provides work for more people, produces food which is consumed locally, has shorter supply chains, and provides greater returns to the farmers,” argues author Miles King.

Post-Brexit, he believes: “An England farm support system could inject much more support into small-scale food production.”

The Land Workers’ Alliance (LWA) agrees. One of eight points raised in its proposed framework for British Agricultural Policy post-Brexit sounds the call: “End the discrimination against small farms”.

The report states: “It is unjustifiable for Defra to continue to discriminate against small farms in the allocation of subsidies and collection of farm data.”

Instead, Miles King proposes a shift to supporting “small-scale sustainable farming which benefits nature”, including paying landowners for the delivery of public goods to society. Public goods “are defined as things which benefit society but do not create a private profit”.

Some public goods are: features making up the fabric of the landscape (like hedges, ponds and streams); the provision of clean water, flood prevention; healthy pollinator populations; carbon storage and sequestration; as well as “the many valuable yet intangible things nature provides to people – inspiration, joy, reflection, solace, emotional and spiritual experiences.”

“These features need protection and management, but it is right that landowners should be paid to carry out that protection and management on behalf of society,” says King.

The EU’s Joint Research Centre estimates that food accounts for around a third of the average European’s impact on climate change, so policy changes will need to be coupled with awareness campaigns on the benefits of buying local, such as saving long cross-country journeys from farm to plate.

Support for this view is found in a 2013 report from the UN trade and environment review. More than 60 international experts came together to contribute to the Wake Up Before It Is Too Late report, which states that an holistic approach to agricultural management is needed, recognising that “a farmer is not only a producer of agricultural goods, but also a manager of an agro-ecological system that provides quite a number of public goods and services.”

Within this approach, there should also be a significant shift from industrial production characterised by monocultures towards “mosaics of sustainable, regenerative production systems that also considerably improve the productivity of small-scale farmers.”

Fruits and vegetables would be a useful place to start, suggests Miles King. Defra statistics show that 24 countries accounted for 90% of the fruit and vegetable supply of the UK (UK supplied 23%), but King argues that, “Many types of fruit and vegetable can now be grown in England both outside and under cover, on highly productive but small plots”.

Worth noting though, is a point made by the EU GLAMUR global and local food chain assessment project which suggests that new policies will need to recognise the “hybridity and interconnectedness of global and local food systems”.

The UK’s food culture has been Europeanised since joining the Common Market in 1973, a study by City University (London) states. And nothing makes more apparent than the fact that pizza is now UK childrens’ favourite food. Membership of the EU has eased the flow of food, yet at the same time local industries have been rebuilt (there are now approximately 100 more UK artisanal cheeses than in France according to the British Cheese Awards).

The study concludes, “Will the British have the confidence to move forward and accept this remarkable post-war culinary learning?”

Now, post-Brexit, this question is more pertinent than ever. Can new policies balance the need for a shift towards small-scale production (for example of pears and apples that don’t need to be imported, but often are), while still satisfying consumer tastes?

 This article is part of a new content-sharing arrangement with the LUSH – the ethical cosmetics company that also works to support sustainable farming practices across the Globe

 

 

 

Never mind Trump – the global energy transition is racing forward

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As captains of the fossil fuel industries and their lobbyists prepare to take over the White House – appointed by a President elected by a minority, claiming to represent the people on an anti-elite ticket yet possessing by far the highest cumulative wealth of any cabinet ever – they will face evidence breaking out all around them of a fast-moving global energy transition threatening to strand the fossil fuels they seek to boost.

“World energy hits a turning point”, a Bloomberg headline read on 16th December. “Solar power, for the first time, is becoming the cheapest form of new electricity”, the article marvelled. Analysis of the average cost of new wind and solar in 58 emerging-market economies – including China, India, and Brazil – showed solar at $1.65 million per megawatt and wind at $1.66.

Google leads the giant corporations eagerly going with this flow. The largest corporate buyer of renewable energy announced on 6th December that it expects to hit its target of 100% renewable power in, wait for it, 2017.

Google is a huge consumer of power, and going solar means deep emissions cuts, especially when solar infrastructure is hooked up with all the digital efficiency-enhancement fandangoes that Silicon Valley giants are zeroing in on in the fast emerging era of artificial intelligence in an internet of things.

Google’s emissions reductions will be meaningful even considering full product life cycles. Solar panels made today pay back the energy used to make them in little more than a year, a Belgian research team from the University of Louvain reported in December.

“For every doubling of installed photovoltaic capacity”, Atse Louwen and his colleagues write, “energy use decreases by 13 and 12% and greenhouse gas footprints by 17 and 24%, for poly- and monocrystalline based photovoltaic systems, respectively.” This means that solar panels now return more energy than American oil: an average energy-return on energy-invested of around 14 (and rising) versus around 11 (and falling).

From California to Mumbai, solar is the energy source of choice

This is excellent news not just for rich Californians but for the developing world, where “solar lanterns and rooftop photovoltaics are becoming the energy of choice”, so Bloomberg reported. In India, “the millions not connected to the grid may never connect” now, dooming much coal to be stranded underground in the process.

The cumulative market of new Indian households accessing small-scale energy is potentially 200 gigawatts, with only a tiny fraction currently served. In Myanmar the government needs no further persuasion: it announced plans to bring solar to all as soon as 2030.

The technical advances in batteries and electric vehicles also became ever clearer in December. “Diesel faces global crash as electric cars shine“, the Financial Times announced. According to a UBS report, this whole category of oil use will be gone from the global market within ten years.

The positives of EVs synergise with the negatives of air pollution to create a perfect storm for diesel. At the C40 cities summit, Paris, Mexico City, Madrid and Athens all vowed to ban diesel vehicles by 2025.

In China, the worst air pollution this year put 24 cities on red alert, with schools shut and flights grounded. Half a billion people were affected by this ‘airpocalypse‘. In Chengdu, protestors took to the streets, putting smog masks on statues in the city centre. A heavy handed response by the police suggested that the government is super-sensitive to this issue.

Which is not to say that the Chinese authorities aren’t trying to abate the problem at source. I have summarised their rapid advances in renewables in earlier monthly reports. This month, a presentation in London by Zhang Gang, Counsellor of the State Council of China, revealed that China’s efforts to use electricity more efficiently, cutting the need for coal, now involve 317 million smart meters in operation across 100% of urban areas and 70% of rural areas.

These are hooked up in smart co-ordination, spanning all aspects of grids, at all scales, in a vast project involving 230 million users. Part of this co-ordination involves China’s first expressway fast-charging EV network, stretching for 1,262 km between Beijing and Shanghai.

No other country comes remotely close to this kind of smart-grid deployment. On 12th December, the International Energy Agency issued a report concluding that China’s coal fired power plants “make no economic sense“. Small wonder.

India is on a similar rapid transition path. On 12th December the Central Electricity Authority announced that India does not need more coal-based capacity addition until 2022. The Authority now plans for non-hydro renewables to meet 43% of electricity as soon as 2027. Such an ambition would have been inconceivable until recently. On the 20th, Bloomberg analysed the widening gap between projected and actual demand in the world’s third largest emitter, and put their conclusion in an encouraging headline: “India’s energy forecasts are falling short and climate could win.”

Pass the fossil-fuel parcel?

What are investors to make of all this? Well, it is rare for a report to hold the potential to change the world. But one published on 14th December did. The Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) aim to give investors, lenders and insurers visibility of how climate-change risk will affect individual businesses, and a roadmap for reacting to it.

The report presents the results of a year of deliberations by 32 representatives of companies with market capitalisation of $1.5 trillion and financial institutions responsible for assets of $20 trillion. Their intention is for the capital markets to behave consistently with the aims of the Paris Agreement on climate change, which is to say progressively retreat from fossil fuels, and increasingly favour clean-energy investments, not least renewables.

A reminder of the background. The target of the Paris Agreement, agreed by every independent nation on the planet in December 2015, is to keep global warming at less than 2C. If society is to do that, most reserves of fossil fuel will have to stay underground, unburnt. Since companies view all reserves as having financial value, this means a risk – should governments do what they promised to do in Paris, or some it – of what investors call ‘stranded assets’: having money invested in a resource that you then can’t realise.

Investing any more money to add to this stock of potentially unburnable reserves creates what can be thought of as a ‘carbon bubble’. The risk of stranded assets is growing with every decision made by fossil-fuel companies to invest in yet more unnecessary fossil fuel projects: new coal mines, new oil and gas fields, new fracking, new fossil fuel power plants, and so on and so on.

The Bank of England awoke to this issue as a systemic risk in September 2015. After listening to arguments by Carbon Tracker, a financial think tank I chair, and other worried financial experts, they came to fear that fossil-fuel asset-stranding would risk wasting a lot of investment capital, and might even threaten global financial stability.

The effort to stop this threat soon went international. The G20’s Financial Stability Board set up a taskforce in December 2015 with a brief to specify the information investors need to be provided with in order for them to avoid stranded-asset risk. It is chaired by no less a figure than Michael Bloomberg.

As soon as his Task Force’s report came out out, more than 30 organisations – including Aviva, Axa, BHP Billiton, JPMorgan and Daimler – announced their support for its conclusions. Many more will surely follow, because the starting point in the TCFD’s proposed roadmap is that companies should include climate-related financial disclosures in their public financial filings. Not to do so would be to ignore material risks to organisations, the Task Force professes.

Those disclosures should span the core elements of how organisations operate: governance, strategy, risk management and the setting of metrics and targets. Crucially, the TCFD advocates, companies should align business models with a 2°C future. Remuneration of chief executives and boards should be linked to the extent to which their companies are hitting targets aimed at a sub-2C world.

$5 trillion disinvested from fossil fuels

Even before the Paris Agreement was adopted last year climate risk was high on the agenda of the world’s largest institutional investors and asset managers. Resolutions asking oil and gas companies to stress test their business models against a 2C-consistent climate outcome were generally opposed by boards, but received record-high support levels from shareholders.

Now there will be no hiding place. The TCFD report provides a template for best practices and a road map for better disclosure. Neither fossil fuel companies nor asset managers investing in them will easily be able to ignore it.

Some investors have not waited for the G20 Task Force’s advice. By the time of the December 2015 Paris climate summit, investment funds with collective assets of $3.4 trillion had either divested from all or some fossil fuels, or announced their intention to.

This movement has continued to grow in 2016. On 12th December the value of funds divested passed $5 trillion. 80% of the funds involved, spanning 688 institutions, are managed by commercial investment and pension funds. This shows that the campaign is now mainstream in the capital markets. Capital is fleeing fossil fuels just as the fossil fuel industries manoeuvre their capos into the White House for the first time.

What damage can a Trump administration do to this analysis? According to a PWC report this month, the impact they can have on global greenhouse emissions will be “pretty small“, if others hold course. With the trends I have chronicled each month in 2016, and the declaration by all governments in Marrakech in November that the Paris process is “irreversible”, a holding of course seems a more than a reasonable assumption.

Trying to derail Paris, and revive coal, Trump will have to somehow suppress the progressive American states. His problem is that 33 states and the District of Columbia have cut carbon emissions while expanding their economies since 2000, including some Republican states. How do you persuade officialdom in those states to revert to a failed economic model that seeks essentially to recouple economic growth and fossil fuel use?

Fifteen of the states, led by California, New York, Virginia, Vermont and New Mexico, have already told Trump that if he tries to kill US climate plans, they will see him in court.

How has Big Energy coped on the transition frontier as 2016 came to a close? Two snapshots. The utility industry continues to be split into companies seeking to defend the fast shrinking status quo, and those now rushing to be part of the new world. One of the latter, Engie (formerly GdF Suez) announced that it sees the oil price falling to $10 as a result of current trends in energy markets, and the wave of clean-energy investments it and other major corporates are making.

That would be interesting, should it transpire. For example, on 1st December BP gave the green light to a $9bn investment in a deepwater oilfield, rather appropriately named Mad Dog 2, due onstream (cue laughter, based on the industry’s record of delivering major projects on time) in 2021. Good luck to them in recouping their investment if Engie’s view of the world comes to pass.

My conclusion, as the new year begins, is that the global energy transition is progressing faster than many people think, and is probably irreversible. Trump’s prospects of resurrecting coal, and giving the oil and gas industry the expansionist dream ticket most of it wants, are very low.

There is a caveat, of course: that he doesn’t manage to blunder into a world war. All bets would be off then.

In 2017, I will consider this wider security question in my summaries, plus the issues of cybersecurity and fast-emerging artificial intelligence and robotics. For they have all now become clearly relevant to the ultimate outcome of the great global drama in the energy-climate-data nexus.

 

 

Dr Jeremy Leggett is a British green-energy entrepreneur, author and advocate who is founding director of Solarcentury, one of the most respected international solar companies; founder and Chairman of SolarAid, a charity set up with 5% of Solarcentury’s annual profits; and Chairman of CarbonTracker, a financial-sector think-tank warning of carbon-fuel asset-stranding risk to the capital markets.

This article was originally published on Jeremy Leggett’s website.

 

Brexit offers a "rare opportunity" to change UK farming practices says the charity People Need Nature

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The new report – entitled A Pebble in the Pond – paints a damning picture of the current state of land management in England, typified by uncapped subsidies, a lack of transparency in how public funds are spent and a food pricing system skewed in the favour of supermarkets.

 A Pebble in the Pond indicates that EU subsidies granted since 1973 have “contributed to a dramatic decline in nature on farmland – land that covers three quarters of England.”

Under the EU Common Agricultural Policy, farmers in the UK receive subsidies totalling £3-4 billion per year (fluctuating depending on the exchange rate between the pound and euro). Around 75% of farm subsidies are paid to landowners “without any obligation to manage the land with nature in mind, as long as they work within the system of rules known as Cross Compliance.”

The report’s author, UK conservationist Miles King, is scathing in his criticism of this system: “Cross compliance has failed to protect the environment from activities such as farm slurry entering rivers and killing wildlife, or soil being washed from maize stubble fields and contributing to downstream flooding.”

King argues that Brexit delivers the impetus to make far-reaching changes to the current farming industry in England, such as redirecting subsidies to support small-scale, sustainable farming and creating well-designed, agri-environment schemes “guaranteed for 25 or 50 years”.

He also imagines the introduction of a separate fund for the protection and management of any land which supports significant archaeology, history, landscape and wildlife. “All of the land, which is valuable enough to be designated as SSSI or as a Scheduled Ancient Monument, should now be designated.”

“The public should be able to see very clearly where their support is going, who is receiving it, and for what.” he says.

Releasing datasets like the Rural Land Register (which contains information concerning farm ownership in Britain) could also “unlock incalculable value” for interested parties, advises land campaigner, Guy Shrubsole. Conversationalists looking to link with landowners in the creation of wildlife corridors, or flood-risk managers designing natural flood defence measures in catchment areas could also benefit.

“‘Leave’ campaigners urged votes to ‘take back control of your country’. ‘Taking back control’ must mean, at minimum, knowing who actually owns our country, and what they’re paid to actually farm and manage it.” says Shrubsole.

“Opening up all this data could be done immediately, long before Brexit is implemented.” he recommends.

So too, could reframing the way that consumers think about the food they buy. “UK consumers spend the lowest proportion of their income on food, out of all the countries of Europe – 15% less than the European average.” says King, adding that, “While the dairy farm sector is in crisis, supermarket profits measure collectively in billions of pounds a year.”

One of his suggestions is small-scale, grassroots projects that begin in schools: “If more schools took part in food-production, had their own allotments, for example, then they could help children understand the link between food production and nature.”

A Pebble in the Pond comes at a time when Brexit, the gyrations of the pound, the similarly fluctuating opinions of politicians, and predictions concerning the bargaining game of trade negotiations are still dominating the headlines.

King urges the general public, as well as policy-makers and politicians, to capitalise fully on Brexit while they still can: “We can and should take this opportunity to change the farm support system, or simply let it slip by. It’s up to all of us to decide”.

This article is part of a new content-sharing arrangement with the LUSH – the ethical cosmetics company that also works to support sustainable farming practices across the Globe

 

 

Trump’s coming ‘climate moment’: and why we should be careful what we wish for…

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Electoral democracy has largely failed. It has been captured by big corporates, suborned and crudified (de-deliberationised) by the corporate media, and sidelined by neoliberal globalisation (and the consequent minute-by-minute power of ‘the markets’).

Perhaps the most spectacular ever instance of the failing of electoral democracy has been very recent indeed: it is the election of Donald Trump to (what is still, even now) the most powerful office in the world.

Probably the most dire but predictable global effect of a Trump Presidency is its catastrophic impact on climate-policy and energy-policy. The most senior salient offices in the land are now stuffed full of the most egregious know-nothing climate-deniers. These people will be busy from Day One of the new administration, actively bringing about the deaths of people all over the world (and especially, in the future) from climate-disasters that would otherwise not occur or that would otherwise not be so severe. (This is not hyperbole. My Green colleague Craig Simmons has undertaken calculations such that it is now possible to produce a (very rough) correlation between GHGs emitted and deaths etc. caused: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anuradha-vittachi/since-flying-is-responsib_b_361777.html

So what is to be done?

Readers of the Ecologist know a lot of the answer. We need to ‘fight’: at Standing Rock; through the ballotbox; through changing our own lifestyles and building bottom-up alternatives; and much much more.

And we must make the most of the good news that there already is: such as Obama’s ban today on Arctic offshore drilling, which may prove difficult for Trump to reverse: http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/obama-places-sweeping-ban-offshore-drilling-n698461 We must seek to ensure that it is. For we know the hard truth: that even if humanity burns only that part of Earth’s fossil fuel reserves that is already accessible, that would be enough to virtually guarantee runaway climate change.

But the point of this piece is to warn you about something that might take the wind out of our sails, something which might risk taking the heart right out of our fight. You heard it here first: sometime in 2017, I suspect that Trump will have a ‘climate moment’. Sometime next year, the American President will probably issue a partial mea culpa, and tell us that he now ‘gets it’ on climate: That human activity IS changing our planet’s climate, and not for the better, after all.

And (if and) when this happens, be prepared. Be prepared for a tidal wave of foolishness from the media about how Trump isn’t as bad as we all thought he was. And for a huge collective sigh of relief from across the world – perhaps we still have a chance on climate, after all, if even Trump can ‘get it’.

Be prepared: because this ‘change of heart’ will not be half as good news as it seems. It might not even be good news at all.

To understand why, we need to understand better why Trump will most likely claim at some point in 2017 to ‘get it’ on climate.

Trump on climate: from denialism to agnosticism to…?

The process has actually already begun. Trump has pulled back somewhat from his previous full-on climate-denialism, to a position of ‘agnosticism’ on the issue: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-climate-change-scepticism-may-withdraw-paris-agreement-a7469221.html Why? Because Trump’s climate-denialism in the election period was partly just a pose, to shore up support among Republicans, and to epater les bourgeois. Now that, incredibly, he has made it all the way to the White House, he can afford to stand back and look more ‘Presidential’, less extreme. A position of studied agnosticism fits the bill nicely.

Meanwhile, as I say, the Administration that he heads is getting stuffed full of climate-deniers: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/donald-trump-environment-climate-change-skeptics They will be working gung-ho to re-fossilise the U.S. economy, and are thus preparing the ground to harvest the faster destruction of the future of our living planet.

So, why would Trump go further than agnosticism on climate in 2017?

Already, Trump and his aides will be receiving briefings every day from those Government agencies that are well aware of the reality and disastrous consequences of human-triggered dangerous climate change. Foremost among these, perhaps, will be the Pentagon, which has a long record now of being part of the ‘reality-based community’ on climate: http://taskandpurpose.com/dont-count-us-military-among-climate-change-skeptics/

This constant drip-drip of truth into the awesomely thick skulls (and thin skins) of Trump and his team will gradually have its effect. Sooner or later, Trump will most likely decide that the moment is ripe to accept reality.

 The PR bonanza awaiting Trump if he accepts the truth on climate

As this moment – literally – of truth approaches, Trump will discuss with his aides the upsides and downsides of joining the reality-based community.

A downside will be that it will annoy some supporters. But that doesn’t matter that much; Trump doesn’t need them much for the next few years, and he will be confident that in any case he can motivate them in other ways with regular extreme tweets, eye-catching speeches to feed the base, and a million other methods.

The biggest upside is that Trump’s acceptance of climate-reality will be a huge story – a story blindsiding most of his critics (unless they have been forearmed by reading the present article, first…). Trump and his publicists will I think be unable to resist its incredible potential for him to sound so reasonable, rowing-back from some of the less tenable aspects of his public persona and stance.

And it could take the wind out of the sails of a remarkable number of his opponents, to hear Trump say, publicly, that climate change is real, partly human-influenced and dangerous.

Be prepared for this. Don’t let the wind be taken out of your sails.

People are so desperately wanting there to be hope for the world. When Trump’s climate moment comes, it will chime all too easily with this desperation. And too many of the intelligentsia will rush with relief toward the conclusion that Trump can be ‘normalised’ after all, and that we aren’t actually on the brink of a sub-fascist, end-game for democracy.

But we still will be. For Trump’s climate moment won’t be the product of a conversion to rationality, science and precaution (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMyxXs3t7Fs). It will be the product of a cynical decision by a self-publicist-‘populist’-President to cut some of his losses, in a way that his critics are (as yet) totally not expecting.

If Trump accepts the human influence on climate, whither climate-policy?

A key question, in order to become clear on why Trump’s climate moment (that I’m here foreseeing) will not in truth be good news, is this: what will be the real-world consequences, the policy-consequences, of Trump’s ‘moment of truth’ vis-a-vis climate? Here’s my guess as to the rough outline of how little difference it will make, how few consequences it will have in the most obvious places and respects:

It will not significantly affect the behaviour of the climate-denying numpties now getting ready to take the reins of the U.S. Federal Government. They will continue to eviscerate regulations, to back big business, and to burn fossil fuels like (in a sadly-telling phrase) there’s no tomorrow. It will not result in the scaling back of Trump’s horrific ‘infrastructure-building’ programme, which will continue to spill roads and bridges and airports across the U.S.A. And so forth.

It will not ensure either that the U.S. does not pull out of the Paris Agreement; there are plenty of reasons for someone like Trump to continue to hate that Agreement (which is by its nature internationalist), even if he admits the reality of the reason for it. And even if the U.S. does remain within that Agreement, Trump’s own climate-change will not ensure that the U.S. does not in effect gut, delay or bog down the implementation of the Agreement (which was already – is – incredibly weak and problematic to begin with: http://kevinanderson.info/blog/is-the-climate-change-academic-community-reluctant-to-voice-issues-that-question-the-economic-growth-paradigm/).

What actual difference then will Trump’s climate conversion make to policy? Here is where things get complicated, and maybe even worse:One piece of actual good news: it will give Trump the excuse he may already have been looking for to help some parts at least of the U.S. renewable energy sector: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/23/trump-may-not-snuff-out-renewable-energy-industry-despite-his-doubts-on-climate-change.html . Why not embrace green-tech when it’s profitable (while going hell for leather for coal, oil, gas, tracings etc., simultaneously)? Even here, though, enormous care is needed: Trump could easily, for example, embrace large scale agro-fuels in the name of ‘green energy’: with calamitous consequence: http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk 

As I already warned above; a bad effect will be the risk that it encourages complacency (as Paris itself, arguably, already does, unjustifiably). There is a terrible danger that a Trump who ‘gets it’ on climate will suddenly seem not worth the trouble of endlessly fiercely opposing; and that the last-ditch struggle to stop climate-catastrophe will start taking a back-seat in the minds of too many climate activists (including, possibly, you, dear reader: which is why I want to forewarn you).

And here’s the really bad news. Here’s where it gets really scary. There are significant elements of the Right that favour a sort of ‘survivalist’ strategy vis a vis threats such as climate: they aren’t interested in the altruism and enlightened self-interest of climate-change-mitigation, but they are interested in ‘adaptation’. Adaptation is indeed necessary, because we are already, tragically, ‘committed’ to some pretty serious harmful climate-change just by virtue of how much we have polluted our atmosphere with GHGs already; but an adaptationist stance alone looks pretty ugly, and capable of making things worse, in the round. Adaptation, consisting of things like building ever higher ‘hard’ flood defences and hardening one’s heart against climate refugees is hardly… heart-warming, as a response to climate-reality. One can imagine Trump adopting a pretty terrifying narrowly adaptionist climate-policy.

The scariest possibility of all, by far, is that a climate ‘wake-up call’ for Trump could take him in the same direction that a number of influential voices on the hard Right (including, notably, Newt Gingrich) have already moved in: that of climate-engineering or ‘geo-engineering’ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/opinion/the-risks-of-climate-engineering.html The idea of a kind of total planetary management of climate fits well with the hubris, techno-utopianism and refusal to change course of many on the Right: in fact, they sound exactly like Trump…. Why alter ‘the American way of life’, if we (who, exactly?) can just put mirrors in space to cool the Earth down a little? The extreme moral hazard of climate-engineering, of course, is that it provides the perfect seeming-excuse for not bothering to rein in our GHG emissions.

Paris, climate-engineering – and the hard Right…

Lest all this seem a remote possibility to you, I want you to notice something that very few people have noticed yet: that the Paris Agreement made climate-engineering mainstream. Worse than that: it committed us to it: http://kevinanderson.info/blog/the-hidden-agenda-how-veiled-techno-utopias-shore-up-the-paris-agreement The Paris figures don’t add up without desperate, utterly untried, utterly reckless vast-scale technological gambles, later this century.

Why not – Trump’s advisers will whisper – speed the process up a little? What bolder idea for Trump than to ‘wake up’ to the reality of human-influenced climate change – and propose that we tackle it in the biggest way imaginable: by allegedly ‘taking charge’ of the Earth’s climate, and finding a ‘solution’ that will let us keep the petrol flowing (and keep the oceans dying, and keep the atmosphere moving into uncharted waters, and so forth) indefinitely? I can see Trump, for example, providing a huge Government funded prize for the most successful (sic) plan to geo-engineer the future. Take it a step further: it’s not that hard to imagine a Hollywood-ification of climate disaster(s) in which Trump’s narrative becomes that of: America ‘saves the world’, by high-tech, ultra-reckless gambles such as mirrors in space, ‘seeding the oceans’, GM-monoculture fuels and forests…

That’s why I say: be careful what you wish for. When Trump’s climate moment comes, we need to be ready to push back. Otherwise, he might ‘lead’ us out of the frying pan of climate-denialism, into the fire (literally) of what would actually be an out-of-control tech-mad future, in which climate reality became an excuse for allowing the world’s biggest polluter (and its military) in effect to take ownership of the atmosphere itself.

This Author

Rupert Read is philosopher working and writing at UEA, the Chair of Green House think tank, and a former parliamentary candidate for the Green Party of England & Wales. He Tweets at: @GreenRupertRead & @rupertread